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In recent years, heightened awareness of longstanding biases 
against women-in educational, economic, employment, and, 
most important, health-related opportunities-has catalyzed an 
expanded focus on women's issues. Past inattention to 
women's health issues in both the conduct of research and 
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clinical practice resulted in serious gaps in knowledge about 
the causes, treatment, and prevention of diseases in women. 1 
It was over a decade ago that the United States Public 
Health Service Task Force on Women's Health Issues concluded 
that the exclusion of women in clinical research had significant-
ly affected the quality of health care available to women.2 
Knowledge concerning the effects of various treatments on wom-
en and their unique needs remains sparse and underdevel-
oped.3 In addition, the majority of drugs have never been test-
ed on pregnant women, primarily because of fetal protection 
policies that prohibit the inclusion of women of childbearing 
potential in most drug trials.4 This knowledge gap has left 
women unable to make informed reproductive and health care 
decisions. Thus, it has become clear that gender matters and 
that health care is no exception.5 
1. OFFICE ON WOMEN'S HEALTH, U.S. PuBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, FAcr SHEET: 
WOMEN'S HEALTH IssuEs {1995) (emphasis added). Women's health often is defmed 
as including the normal biological processes, as well as all diseases, disorders, or 
conditions that affect women across the life span and that are unique to, more prev-
alent among, or more serious in women, or for which there are different risk factors 
or interventions for women than for men. See generally OFFICE OF REsEARCH ON 
WOMEN'S HEALTH, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL IN-
STITUTES OF HEALTH: OPPORTUNITY FOR REsEARCH ON WOMEN'S HEALTH (1991) [here-
inafter ORWH REPORT]; Task Force on Women's Health Issues, U.S. Public Health 
Service, Women's Health: Report of the Public Health Service Task Force on l'lomen's 
Health Issues, 100 PuB. HEALTH REP. 73 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. It is 
important to recogni2e that "women" are a large, heterogeneous group-women of 
color, women with disabilities, girls, adolescents, postmenopausal women, homeless 
women, immigrant women. To incorporate the distinctive and sometimes disparate 
needs of all women requires tackling the psychosocial issues that contextunlizs spe-
cific medical problems: racism, sexism, violence against women, gender roles, poverty, 
and health beliefs. See Task Force Report, supra, at 85 (noting that research and 
service programs addressing women's health must address "enduring characteristics 
[such] as age, race, or ethnicity as well as . . . marital and household status, urban 
or rural living, education, occupation, and income"). 
2. See Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 82 ("A systematic effort must be 
made to address issues relating to gender bias, in research and clinical practice, that 
lead to inadequate attention to the needs of women." (emphasis added)). 
3. See 1 COMMITTEE ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IssUES, INSTITUTE OF MEDI-
CINE, WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL IssUES OF INCLUDING 
WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES 27 (Anna C. Mastroianni et nl. eds, 1994) [hereinafter 
WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH]. The two main concerns include the lack of knowl-
edge concerning gender differences in relation to health problems common to both 
men and women and lack of investigations of health problems specific to women. See 
id. 
4. See L. Elizabeth Bowles, The Disenfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clini-
cal Trials: The Legal Ramifications of and Solutions for Reclifying the Knowledge 
Gap, 45 VAND L. REv. 877, 883 (1992). 
5. See generally Karen H. Rothenberg, New Perspeclives for Teaching and 
Scholarship: The Role of Gender in Law and Health Care, 54 l\.ID. L. REv. 473, 480 
(1995) ("[G]ender does matter in the context of both law and biomedical sciences."). 
HeinOnline -- 32 Hous. L. Rev. 1204 1995-1996
1204 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1201 
Over the last few years, data gathered by women's health 
advocates have caught the attention of researchers, policymak-
ers, and the general public.6 As a result, legislative and regula-
tory changes have begun to promote the inclusion of women in 
clinical research. 7 It is hoped that a better understanding of 
women's health issues and gender differences will lead to the 
removal of barriers to quality health care for American women. 
This Article examines gender bias in health care and the 
legal and ethical ramifications of including women in research 
and in improving their access to health care.8 Part II reviews 
the pervasiveness of gender bias in health care. It highlights 
numerous examples of how gender bias creates barriers to all 
levels of women's health, from clinical research to the delivery 
of health care services, and explores the reasons for these bar-
riers, including societal attitudes and gender differences in 
communication. Part III reviews the historical development of 
regulatory policies designed to protect human subjects from 
research risks. It argues that federal regulations restricting the 
participation of women in clinical trials codified societal distrust 
of women's capacity to decide what was best for them, their 
fetuses, and families. The evolution toward inclusion is dis-
cussed in this historical context as the focus shifts from pro-
tecting "vulnerable" women (or their fetuses) from the burdens 
of experimentation to increasing the inclusion of women in 
clinical trials in order to benefit their health. While new regula-
tions purport to increase inclusion of women, they do not an-
swer the most difficult questions involving pregnant women. 
Part IV explores the ethical and legal ramifications of gen-
der bias, primarily in the context of clinical research, as a non-
financial barrier to health care. More specifically, it explores 
the policy underpinnings of the Supreme Court's recognition in 
6. See ORWH REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the lack of knowledge 
about women's health as "a crisis that has stunned citizens, policymakers, and the 
biomedical community"). The report concluded that women will become the larger 
population and will find themselves most susceptible to disease in the future. See id. 
It also pointed out that some conditions are uniquely female or affect women differ· 
ently than men. See id. 
7. Refer to Parts II and III infra. 
8. This Article is limited to an analysis of gender "bias" as a nonfinancial bar-
rier to health care. Obviously, financial barriers significantly impede women's access 
to health care. For example, women are disproportionately employed in temporary or 
low-paying service jobs that do not provide health benefits. Of the 35 million unin-
sured Americans, almost 12 million are adult women between the ages of 18 and 65. 
See THE AMERICAN WOMAN: 1994-95, WHERE WE STAND, WOMEN AND HEALTH, 27, 
144 (Cynthia Costello & Anne J. Stone eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN WOM· 
AN]. There are many more million women that are underinsured, particularly with 
respect to access to needed preventive services. See id. 
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UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 9 that women can be trusted to 
make appropriate decisions concerning their reproductive health 
and that differential application of privileges to men and wom-
en constitutes gender discrimination. 
Part IV then analyzes the constitutional issues, particularly 
with respect to the liberty and privacy interests of women, 
raised by the regulatory barriers to the participation of women 
in clinical research and current paternal consent requirements. 
It also considers the equal protection issues raised by 
underinclusion and overinclusion of women relative to men in 
clinical research. 
Part IV continues with an analysis of federal and state 
antidiscrimination statutes and their application to both clinical 
research and health care access. Finally, it concludes with a 
discussion of the tort liability issues raised by the participation 
of women in clinical research. Historically, drug manufacturers 
and researchers excluded women from their clinical trials, in 
part, for fear of liability resulting from harm to potential off-
spring. In the future, however, liability will likely be based on 
the exclusion of women as the standard of care develops to 
adapt drugs and treatment to gender differences based on clini-
cal research. 
Finally, Part V concludes with a discussion of major policy 
considerations that are largely based on the work of the Insti-
tute of Medicine's Committee on the Ethical and Legal Issues 
Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies. It also 
highlights the need to reform our national research agenda, 
health professional education, and the representation of women 
in science and medicine. Even more basically, it concludes that 
we must recognize that gender matters in the way we view 
women and their decisionmaking capabilities, in the way pa-
tients and providers communicate, and ultimately, in the way 
health care is delivered. 
II. GENDER BIAS: REALITIES AND REAsONS 
[T]he vast majority of women's health concerns . . . are 
the same as men's but all too often aren't taken as seriously, 
treated as appropriately, or understood as well.10 
9. 499 U.S. 187 (1991). Johnson Controls involved a Title Vll challenge to a 
fetal protection policy in the workplace. See id. at 192. For further discussion of its 
application to gender bias in clinical research and health care, refer w subpart IV(A) 
infra. 
10. LEsLIE LAURENCE & BETH WEINHOUSE, OUTRAGEOUS PRACI'ICES: THE 
.ALARMING TRUTH ABOUT HOW MEDICINE :MISTREATS WOMEN 7 (1994). 
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Medicine is only as good as the knowledge it's based on, 
and the best doctor in the world can't compensate for faulty 
research.11 
For the most part, the lack of knowledge about wo,men's 
health has resulted from our failure to research women's health 
issues. Commentators point to the reinforcement of gender 
attitudes and the history of protectionism that have led to cur-
rent gaps in medical knowledge.12 Several notions associated 
with gender have contributed to the systematic exclusion of 
women from clinical research. These factors include the percep-
tion of men as the "norm," the idea that hormonal differences 
in women will "complicate" research results and increase costs, 
the traditional role of women, and the primarily male-dominat-
ed research community.13 For pregnant women, these barriers 
are also entangled with potential risks to the fetus and the 
associated liability that might follow. 14 
Science has a long history of viewing men as the standard 
by which all things are measured. "Like the pronoun 'he,' it 
was taken for granted that the white male subject stood for all 
of us."15 Because the research community views men as the 
norm, they see differences in women as unknown variables that 
tend to confound results. For example, women present factors 
such as menstrual cycles, pregnancy, teratogenic liability, and 
menopause.16 Some researchers argue that these factors com-
plicate research and add excess costs to experimentation. 17 
Paradoxically, "scientists seem to be confirming that women's 
bodies are different and more difficult to study. But then by 
simply extending their male-drawn conclusions to women, they 
are implying that-with a few obvious exceptions-women's 
bodies are the same as men's. "18 These assumptions have dis-
couraged studies on females and have fostered ignorance con-
cerning the special needs of women. 19 
11. Id. at 3. 
12. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Re-
search, 22 HAsTINGS CENTER REP. 24, 24 (1992). 
13. See id. at 25-26, 27-28. 
14. See id. at 25. 
15. Id. at 27. 
16. See Bowles, supra note 4, at 881. 
17. See Tracy Johnson & Elizabeth Fee, Women's Participation in Clinical Re· 
search: From Protectionism to Access, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra 
note 3, at 6. 
18. LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 4. 
19. See id. (noting that instead of seeking solutions to some of the problems 
presented with studying women, "scientists have simply taken the easy way out and 
studied men"). 
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The perception of the middle-aged white male as the 
normal economic distributor and an emphasis on the economic 
costs of health care also may have led to this disproportionate 
concern for the health of men.20 In addition to outnumbering 
women in positions of political influence, men also dominate in 
the medical research community.21 Although the proportion of 
women in medical schools has risen steadily in the last decade 
to approximately forty percent,22 women still constitute a mi-
nority of medical researchers and a small percentage of those 
making funding decisions.23 Naturally, policymakers and re-
searchers prioritize issues according to their most personal 
interests.24 AB a result, women's concerns, as well as the un-
derlying variables of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and 
sexual orientation, have not been given the attention they de-
serve.25 Because men dominate the decisionmaking community, 
the social worth judgments of how to allocate funds also favor 
research on men. 26 
The Public Health Task Force on Women's Health Issues 
concluded that many methodological problems, as well as lack 
of data, limit the ability to understand the status of women's 
health and women's particular health care needs.27 In study 
after study of health issues important to women, women have 
been excluded or seriously underrepresented. 
~0. See Dresser, supra note 12, at 28 (maintaining that an emphasis on the 
economic costs of disease may lead to disproportionate amounts of research on the 
young or middle-aged white male). 
21. See id. (noting that science ~has been and to some extent still is largely 
populated by white males"). 
22. See AssOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, WOMEN IN U.S. ACA-
DEMIC MEDICINE: STATISTICS 1995, at 1 (1995) (citing a 41% figure). 
23. See Bowles, supra note 4, at 883. 
24. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 5 (relating a female NIH 
doctor's observation that "[y]ou want doctors to study what they're interested in, so 
you have male doctors in their fifties studying other male doctors in their fifties for 
heart attacks"). 
25. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 114 (indicating that 
a growing body of evidence indicates that these variables have a significant impact 
on health and should be examined in clinical studies). 
26. Members of the dominant group see themselves as "objectivea and the exist-
ing social structure as "natural." Dresser, supra note 12, at 27-28. Accordingly, the 
"special money" necessary for studies of women and minorities reflects the social 
worth judgment that "regular money" should be reserved for "normala research on 
the group with greater socially determined priority, white males. Id. at 28. 
27. See Task Force Report, supra note 1, at 81. 
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A Gender Gaps in Clinical Research 
Perhaps the most shocking example of the exclusion of 
women from the clinical study of a health condition that almost 
exclusively affects women was a project that examined the 
impact of obesity on breast and uterine cancer. The study par-
ticipants were all men.28 For twenty years, women were also 
excluded from the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging, one 
of the largest studies of the natural process of aging.29 Six 
years after women were permitted to participate, a report of the 
study findings entitled "Normal Human Aging" was pub-
lished.30 It is considered the definitive study of aging in the 
United States. It contains no data on women.31 
Women were also frequently left out of clinical trials of 
experimental AIDS therapies, 32 yet women now represent the 
fastest growing population with AIDS.33 Of the 28 trials of 
drugs designed to fight HIV, only 131 of 2634 participants were 
women.34 In addition, when the FDA approved AZT in 1987, 
not one of the 63 federally-sponsored studies had analyzed its 
effects on women. 35 
The effects of exclusion from clinical research are far reach-
ing. All women suffer the consequences of studies that include 
only men, or that include women, but do not adequately ana-
lyze any gender-related differences. Because of the research 
gap, "physicians now frequently lack adequate evidence on 
whether women . . . will be helped, harmed, or not affected at 
all by numerous therapies now endorsed as promoting 'human 
28. See id. at 24. The author further noted that the study examined the effects 
of particular nutrients on estrogen metabolism, and researchers chose only male 
subjects in the belief that estrogen metabolism is similar in men and women. See id. 
at 29 n.2. 
29. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 61. Women are the "aging 
majority" in this country. As of 1990, women represent almost 60% of the population 
over 65 and 72% of the population over 85. ORWH REPORT, supra note 1, at 9. 
Women also have an average life expectancy of 78.6 years, almost 7 years longer 
than men. Id. at 8. 
30. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 61. 
31. See id. 
32. See id. at 144 (quoting one doctor's observation that "'[w]e don't know a lot 
about HIV in women because almost all the studies that were done originally were 
done on men' "). 
33. ORWH REPORT, supra note 1, at 10. 
34. LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 149. For example, women rep· 
resented only 5.3% of the research subjects in studies testing drugs for cytomegalovi-
rus retinitis, 7.1% for mycobacterium avium complex, and 7.9% for pneumocystis 
carinii pneumonia therapy-yet women with AIDS succumb to these infections at the 
same rate as men with AIDS. Id. at 149-50. 
35. Id. at 5. 
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health.' "36 It is not surprising that women experienced toxic 
side effects when given AZT dosages to treat AIDS calibrated to 
the ever-popular seventy-kilogram male.37 Physicians treating 
women with AIDS are still left guessing at drug dosing.38 
When the results of the study comparing the benefits of AZT to 
the drug deoxyinosine were released in 1992, only four percent 
of the participants were female, too small a percentage to pro-
vide meaningful information to physicians about drug treatment 
regimens.39 
Several well-known studies of cardiovascular disease consid-
ered only male subjects.40 Although they have had a signifi-
cant impact on the treatment and prevention of heart disease 
in men, these studies have not produced definitive information 
about prevention and treatment of women's heart disease.41 In 
fact, the lack of research on women's health and gender-blind 
health conditions in women may have a dangerous e:ffect.42 
Based on the findings of studies of heart disease and cholester-
ol that included men only, the American Heart Association rec-
ommended a diet that could actually elevate the risk of heart 
disease for women.43 A study of 51,529 male health profession-
als begun in 1986 suggested that moderate drinking and a 
decrease in heart disease are causally related."" It is unclear, 
however, whether the result of this study can be extrapolated 
for application to women's health. For example, unlike men, 
36. Dresser, supra note 12, at 24. 
37. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 5. 
38. See id. at 150. 
39. See id. 
40. See EDWARD B. DIETHRICH & CAROL COHAN, WOMEN AND HEART DISEASE 
11-12 (1992); 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 65. 
41. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 65; see also 
Nanette K Wenger, Excluswn of the Elderly and Women from Coronary Trials: Is 
Their Quality of Care Compromised?, 268 JAMA 1460, 1460-61 (1992) (reporting that 
exclusion of women from studies because of an assumption that cardiovascular dis-
ease is comparable in women and men "has resulted in sizable gaps in our knowl-
edge about gender differences in efficacy of preventive strategies, • • . diagnostic 
methods, responses to medical and surgical therapies, and clinical outcomes for coro-
nary heart disease"). One physician has said, " 'If a fifty-year-old man goes to the 
doctor complaining of chest pains, the next day he will be on a treadmill taking a 
stress test. If a fifty-year old woman goes to the doctor and complains of chest 
pains, she will be told to go home and rest.'" Dresser, supra note 12, at 26. 
42. In the Hypertension Detection and Follow-Up study, 168% more women 
who were given "'stepped care'" treatment died than women who were on control. 
See Vanessa Merton, The Excluswn of Pregnant, Pregnable and Once-Pregnable Peo-
ple (a.k.a. Women) from Bwmedical Research, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 369, 383 & n.57 
(1993). 
43. See Dresser, supra note 12, at 27. 
44. See Eric B. Rimm et al., Prospective Study of Alcohol Consumption and 
Risk of Coronary Disease in Men, 338 LANCET 464, 464 (1991). 
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"women who consume moderate quantities of alcohol have an 
increased risk of breast cancer. "45 
In 1988, the results of a government funded study of 
20,000 male physicians revealed that small doses of aspirin 
would help prevent heart attacks. 46 
Physicians were thought to be the ideal subjects, 
knowledgeable and disciplined, and able to comply with com-
plicated research protocols. Women, who comprised 10 percent 
of physicians in the United States at the time, were excluded 
from the study. Nurses, the vast majority of whom were wom-
en, apparently weren't considered up to the task.47 
B. Gender Disparities in Clinical Decisionmaking 
Gender bias extends beyond clinical research into all areas 
of health care: "[l]t pervades medicine, beginning with medical-
school admissions and education, encompassing research facili-
ties and medical journals, and culminating in how women are 
treated as patients in clinics, hospitals, and physicians' offices 
across the country."46 For example, men are more likely to be 
referred for diagnostic testing for lung cancer than women, even 
where risk factors are equal between the two genders.49 Wom-
en in need of kidney dialysis are approximately 30% less likely 
to receive a transplant than men. 50 Men are 6.5 times more 
likely to be referred for cardiac catheterization than women. 51 
At the same time, 26% of men versus 14% of women receive 
clot-dissolving drugs after a heart attack.52 Further, another 
study indicated that physicians are twice as likely to attribute 
symptoms of heart disease in women to psychiatric and 
45. Charles Fuchs et al., Alcohol Consumption and Mortality Among Women, 
332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1245, 1245 (1995). The study also found that, while light to 
moderate drinking is associated with decreased cardiovascular deaths in women, this 
benefit applies mainly to older women and those women otherwise at risk for coro-
nary disease. See id. at 1249. 
46. See THE AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 8, at 91. Unfortunately, there was 
no data to substantiate whether an aspirin a day for women would have any impact 
on their risk of heart disease. 
47. Id. 
48. LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 5. 
49. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Medical Ass'n, Gender 
Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559, 560 (1991) [hereinafter Gen· 
der Disparities] (reporting that among men and women with similar smoking habits, 
men were twice as likely to receive cytologic studies of sputum; even after smoking 
status and other medical considerations were taken into account, men still had 1.6 
times the chance of receiving cytologic testing). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 104. 
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noncardiac causes.53 
With respect to AIDS, it was not until 1993 that the Cen-
ter for Disease Control (CDC) amended its presumptive defini-
tion of AIDS to include those manifestations most common in 
women, i.e., cervical cancer, pelvic inflammatory disease, and 
vaginal yeast infections.54 After the change, thousands more 
women were classified as having AIDS.55 Even after being di-
agnosed and entering treatment, women still receive fewer 
services than men. For example, a male injection drug user 
(IDU) with AIDS is 20% more likely to be hospitalized than a 
woman with AIDS, and then the hospital costs of treating a 
male IDU with AIDS is over $9000 more per year than the 
hospital care costs of treating a woman with AIDS.w It is also 
worth noting that a large prospective study conducted by Terry 
Beirn Community Programs for Clinical Research on AIDS 
recently found that HIV-infected women face an increased risk 
of death when compared with men.57 The authors of the study 
suggest that the reasons for excess mortality in HIV-infected 
women might include lower socioeconomic status, domestic 
violence, and the lack of social support,53 factors that reflect 
differential access to health care for women.~>9 
C. The Role of Gender in the Physician-Patient Relationship 
Bias has also been reported in studies that evaluate the 
relationship between the gender of a physician and the offering 
of gender-sensitive diagnostic practices, such as breast exams, 
pap smears, and mammograms. Women who reported having a 
male physician as their usual provider were less likely to re-
ceive pap tests and mammograms than women who reported 
having a female physician as their usual care proVider.w There 
53. See Gender Disparities, supra note 49, at 560. 
54. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 148-49. 
55. See id. 
56. See Fred J. Hellinger, The Use of Health Services by Women with HN 
Infection, 28 HEALTH SERVICES REs. 543, 543 (1993). 
57. See Sandra L. Melnick et al., Survival and Disease Progression According to 
Gender of Patients with HN Infection: The Terry Beim Community Programs for 
Clinical Research on AIDS, 272 JAMA 1915, 1915 (1994). 
58. See id. at 1919. During a 15 month period of observation, women had sig-
nificantly lower rate of survival than men, even though disease progression rates did 
not differ significantly by gender. Id. 
59. See id. at 1915. 
60. See Peter Franks & Carolyn l\1. Clancy, Physician Gender Bias in Clinical 
Decisionmaking: Screening for Cancer in Primary Care, 31 MED. CARE 213, 213 
. (1993). 
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was a similar but insignificant trend for breast exams. 61 These 
results persisted after "multivariate adjustment for patient age, 
race, education, income, insurance status, subjective health 
status, other health behaviors, and attitudes toward health care 
and health insurance."62 
In another study, rates of pap smears and mammograms 
ordered were consistently higher for female physicians than for 
male physicians.63 The difference was particularly significant 
between physicians in internal medicine and family practice. 64 
Women physicians may be more likely to exercise greater dili-
gence in initially and repeatedly offering screening tests.65 
They also may communicate the risk of cancer more effective-
ly.66 Women patients may be more likely to follow through in 
obtaining tests suggested by women physicians because they 
are more comfortable discussing issues of concern with female 
physicians. 67 
In her book, You Just Don't Understand, Deborah Tannen 
has described differences in the communication styles of men 
and women.66 Some of these differences may, in part, explain 
why gender matters in medical care. Because communication is 
the fundamental instrument by which physician and patient re-
late to each other and attempt to achieve therapeutic goals, the 
relationship between physician and patient is central to the 
process of health care delivery. Physicians must promote 
trust-they must hear the patient's story. 
As one author has observed, "institutional authority of the 
physician and acquiescence to that authority by the patient, 
fostered frequently by gender expectations, can make it difficult 
for patients to assert their informational needs."69 For exam-
ple, women who believe they have serious diseases may present 
their worries in a vague manner in an effort to avoid being 
labeled hypochondriacs. 70 
61. Id. at 216-17. 
62. Id. at 213. 
63. See Nicole Lurie et al., Preventive Care for Women: Does the Sex of the 
Physician Matter?, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 478, 479 (1993). 
64. See id. at 481. 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. See id. 
68. See DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND (1990). 
69. M. Robin DiMatteo, The Physician-Patient Relationship: Effects on the 
Quality of Health Care, 37 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 149, 153 (1994). 
70. See Kirsti Malterud, Strategies for Empowering Women's Voices in the Medi· 
cal Culture, 14 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT'L 365, 370 (1993); see also Leifur 
Dungal, Physicians' Responses to Patients: A Study of Factors Involved in the Office 
Interview, 6 J. FAM. PRAC. 1065, 1069 (1978) (finding that physicians express anxi· 
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The most difficult physician-patient relationships tend to be 
between male physicians and female patients. Some research 
has shown that male physicians may discourage information 
exchange with female patients. For example, compared to male 
physicians, female physicians engage in significantly more posi-
tive talk, partnership-building, question-asking, and 
information-giving.71 Similarly, when with female physicians, 
patients talk more during the medical visit and appear to par-
ticipate more actively in the medical dialogue.72 The longest 
visits are between female physicians and female patients and 
the shortest between male physicians and female patients.73 
Both male and female patients are more willing to disclose 
symptoms to a physician of the same sex than to a physician of 
opposite sex. Research has shown that female-female interac-
tions are characterized by fewer interruptions of patients by 
physicians.74 Fear and embarrassment may in fact be further 
barriers to health care, especially among special population 
groups, including low income blacks, hispanics, and women over 
fifty.75 . 
A few recent studies have, in fact, surveyed women's atti-
tudes about physician-patient communication. In the 1993 Com-
monwealth Fund study of over 2500 women and 1000 men, 1 
out of 4 women (compared to 12% of men) said that they had 
been "'talked down to'" or treated like a child by their physi-
cian.76 Nearly 1 out of 5 women (compared to 7% of men) had 
been told that a reported medical condition was "'all in [your] 
ety, frustration, and less comfort when treating female patients). 
71. See Debra Roter et al., Sex Differences in Patients' and Physicians' Commu· 
nication During Primary Care Medical Vrsits, 29 MED. CARE 1083, 1089 (1991). 
72. See Nancy Zare et al., Sex of Provider as a Variable in Effective Genetic 
Counseling, 19 Soc. SCI. & Z..1Eo. 671, 674 (1984) (noting that women who received 
genetic counseling from female physicians discussed a wider variety of topics and 
addressed more "care counseling issues" than women who were counseled by male 
physicians). 
73. See Roter et al., supra note 71, at 1087 (indicating that visits with female 
doctors led to one-third more total statements than with male doctors). Communica· 
tion seems to be enhanced with same sex dyads when (1) the patient prefers to be 
treated by a physician of the same sex, (2) sex-specific conditions are being ad· 
dressed, (3) conditions of a highly personal or sensitive nature are being treated 
such that sex or sexuality are especially relevant, or (4) when a long-term relation-
ship between physician and patient is required. See Carol S. Weisman, Vlomen and 
Their Health Care Providers: A Matter of Communication: Communications Between 
Women and Their Health Care Providers: Research Findings and Unanswered Ques· 
tions, 102 PuB. HEALTH REP. 147, 150 (Supp. 1987). 
74. See Weisman, supra note 73, at 150. 
75. See Kathy Coyne et al., Reaching Special Populations with Breast and 
Ceroical Cancer Public Education, 7 J. CANCER Eouc. 293, 293 (1992). 
76. COMMONWEALTH FuND, SURVEY OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 7 (1993). 
HeinOnline -- 32 Hous. L. Rev. 1214 1995-1996
1214 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1201 
head.'"77 
A recent Gallop survey of 833 women aged 45-60 found 
that the physical and emotional effects of menopause most 
frequently cited as the greatest concerns were osteoporosis, 
emotional well-being, and heart disease.78 Of the women who 
reported these conditions, only about half said their physicians 
had discussed emotional symptoms or heart disease with them, 
while two-thirds said that their physicians had discussed osteo-
porosis. 79 Instead, physicians were more likely to discuss short-
term physical symptoms such as hot flashes and night 
sweats.80 
Communication barriers may be of particular concern to the 
older female population. 81 In addition to sensory losses and 
concerns about the use of medical jargon, psychosocial factors 
were a major concern.82 Older women may fear being labelled 
as a nuisance, hypochondriac, or "'crabby old woman.' "83 Many 
older women report being intimidated by doctors and consider 
them as god-like entities who are busy with important matters 
and should not be bothered with their trivial aches and 
pains.84 Older women may feel particularly timid about private 
or embarrassing information and are likely to accept poorly 
communicated explanations, believing they are the ones who 
are at fault.85 
In another study, health care professionals' impressions of 
women with cancer were compared with their impressions of 
women with other serious diseases. 86 All the professionals 
thought they would feel more tense treating a woman who had 
been diagnosed with breast cancer or lung cancer or who had 
been burned severely than a woman who had experienced a 
77. Id. In general, women reported greater communication problems with their 
physicians and were more likely to change doctors because of their dissatisfaction 
(41% of all women versus 27% of men). Id. Though women of color were less satis· 
fled with their physicians than white women, they were less likely to change physi· 
cians or to have access to health care choices. Id. at 10. 
78. See Teri Randall, Women Need More and Better Information on Menopause 
from Their Physicians, Says Survey, 270 JAMA 1664, 1664 (1993). 
79. See id. 
80. See id. 
81. See M. Jean Root, Women and Their Health Care Providers: A Matter of 
Communication: Communication Barriers Between Older Women and Physicians, 102 
PuB. HEALTH REP. 152, 152 (Supp. 1987). 
82. See id. at 154. 
83. Id. at 155. 
84. See id. 
85. See id. 
86. See Kimeron N. Hardin & B. Jo Hailey, Health Care Professionals' Percep· 
tions of Seriously Ill Women, 14 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN lNT'L 7, 7 (1993). 
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heart attack.87 The study also examined how different catego-
ries of health care professions perceive emotional issues sur-
rounding serious illness.88 It concluded that nurses and psy-
chologists perceived more need for psychological counseling than 
did physicians.89 
In the context of contraception and reproductive health, the 
contrast becomes clear between the provider's biomedical as-
sumptions based on physiological orientation and the woman's 
contextual understandings based on knowledge of their social 
lives.90 Of even more importance is that medical dominance 
over the parameters of interaction produces inadequate commu-
nication, which in turn leads to inadequate medical care.91 
Physicians may cut off women when they try to raise topics 
that are not directly medical in nature. 92 Women come to phy-
sicians for help and understanding on how to adjust their bod-
ies to their social lives, whereas the medical model assumes 
that women should adjust their social lives to their bodies.93 
Gender differences may be further compounded by the 
dependency and inequality inherent in the provider-patient 
relationship.94 When the power between the parties is unequal-
ly distributed, effective participation is undermined and control 
87. See id. at 14. 
88. See id. at 10. 
89. See id. Provider gender may have influenced these results because most of 
the nurses were women while most of the physicians were men. See id. Previous 
research had found that physicians overrated the importance of pain on cancer pa-
tients and underrated the importance that the patients placed on disruption of lei-
sure activities. See id. at 8-9. That previous research also revealed that nurses over-
rated the importance of physical appearance changes and underrated being able to 
complete routine household chores. See id. at 9. In addition, other research had 
found that personal reactions of health care providers to diagnoses could affect their 
ability to provide objective and comprehensive care. See id. 
90. See ALExANDRA D. TODD, INTIMATE ADVERSARIES: CULTURAL CONFLICT BE-
TWEEN DOCTORS AND WOMEN PATIENTS 5 (1989) ("Contraception, then, illuminates 
problems in the doctor-patient relationship in general and the doctor-female patient 
relationship in particular."). 
91. 
Thus doctors who are the group that most needs to hear what patients and 
critics are saying, are the least likely group to be listening .... The doctor-
patient relationship, however, carries a special impetus to avoid such misun-
derstanding .... It can contribute to control or lack of control over repro-
ductive processes, it can improve or decrease health; it can mean life or 
death. 
Id. at 6. 
92. See id. at 5 (noting that the "subtler question• of which topics are allowed 
is rarely addressed). 
93. See id. at 4. 
94. See Patricia Peppin, Power and Disadvantage in Medical Relationships, 3 
TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 221, 222 (1994). 
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of the ultimate decision is minimized.95 Without power, pa-
tients cannot give effect to their own values without difficulty, 
whether on a personal, cultural, religious, or otherwise group-
defined basis.96 When patients find themselves unable to con-
trol decisionmaking, the likelihood increases that unwanted 
risks may be imposed on them.97 
Ironically, all this medical attention may harm women, as 
evidenced by recent concerns about high rates of hysterectomies 
and cesarean sections. 98 In the area of mental health, women 
are consistently treated more frequently and more aggressively 
than men. For example, numerous studies conducted over the 
last twenty years have shown that when men and women pres-
ent the same physical or emotional complaints, women are 
significantly more likely to receive antidepressants, tranquiliz-
ers, and other psychotropic drugs. 99 
In fact, women do use health services more than men.100 
Nevertheless, the effects of gender on the doctor-patient rela-
tionship may undermine the value of the health care they re-
ceive. Even though women use more health services and report 
more symptoms, 101 we still do not know whether women and 
men seeking health care differ in the number or types of symp-
toms they disclose to the physician.102 Women may ask more 
questions, but we do not know why.103 It could be attributed 
to greater exposure to sources of health information, to greater 
acceptance of health-seeking roles, or to less clear information 
women receive from their physicians.104 
As noted earlier, women's roles and experiences within the 
health care system differ from those of men. Professional pat-
terns of dominance not only mirror, but reinforce social expec-
tations of men as knowledgeable authorities and of women as 
deferential servants who follow but do not initiate treatment 
programs. The gender imbalance within health care structures 
95. See id. at 223. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 171, 180. 
99. Women receive 73% of all prescriptions written for psychotropic medication 
(the figure rises to 90% when the prescribing physician is not a psychiatrist). Id. at 
275-76. Women receive up to 83% of prescriptions for antidepressants, which exceeds 
the 66% that one would expect to be based on the two-to-one female-to-male ratio 
for depression. Id. at 276. It has been suggested that women's disadvantaged posi-
tion in society puts them at a higher risk for mental illness. See id. 
100. See Weisman, supra note 73, at 147. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. at 148. 
103. See id. 
104. See id. 
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encourages doctors to accept prevailing social attitudes about 
women and illness. In appropriating the authority to define 
what is normal and healthy for women, male professionals have 
ensured women's continuing dependency on them. 
It is this traditional role of women that has, in fact, rein-
forced the exclusion of women from clinical research.10:; Until 
recent decades, men served as the providers and women as the 
caregivers.106 Society has placed an emphasis on women as 
instruments of reproduction rather than on women as individu-
als with unique personal concerns and needs.107 Thus, in con-
sidering the relative worth of women, the medical community 
tended to value reproductive issues over the general health of 
women.108 
All of these gender-based obstacles increase exponentially 
for pregnant women, who face the added consideration of bal-
ancing their own health needs with associated risks to the 
fetus. Society has created the expectation that a woman must 
always place the well-being of her child before all other con-
cerns. 109 Thus, the pregnant woman bears the highest moral, 
ethical, and legal responsibilities to her fetus. 11° Furthermore, 
society may stigmatize a woman who does not make an "accept-
able" decision concerning her own health and its relation to 
that of the fetus: 
A woman who refuses medical treatment is seen as irra-
tional if she chooses to rely on the forces of nature or the vlill 
of God, rather than on the technological intervention of her 
physician; she is irrational if she trusts the medical establish-
ment less than she trusts her own moral or medical judgment; 
she is irrational if she fears her own death more than she 
fears the death of the fetus. She demonstrates her rationality 
by a willingness to deny her self-interest and relinquish her 
moral decision-making power.111 
By establishing protectionist policies in clinical research 
and health care, society has wrestled the decisionmaking power 
105. See Merton, supra note 42, at 386 n. 78. 
106. See id. at 386. 
107. See id. (noting the biomedical research community's "obsession" with the 
possibility of pregnancy). 
108. See id. 
109. See CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN'S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE 
POLITICS OF FETAL RIGHTS 1 (1993) (arguing that the "notion that the fetus has 
rights, as a patient and a citizen, separate from the pregnant woman's, has generat-
ed a deep crisis in reproductive relations in the United States"}. 
110. See id. at 2 (maintaining that the mother's rights "are potentinlly made 
contingent by fetal rights"). 
111. Id. at 48-49. 
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away from women and reinforced the pregnant woman's obliga-
tion to conform to social expectations concerning traditional 
gender roles. In essence, protectionism devalues women as indi-
viduals and characterizes them as vulnerable vessels of repro-
duction, incapable of making the correct choices concerning 
their health and that of their own offspring.112 It is this 
premise, in fact, that puts into context the evolution of regula-
tory barriers that excluded women from clinical research. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATION: PROTECTIONISM, 
PITFALLS, AND PROGRESS 
The participation of human subjects in biomedical and 
behavioral research is governed by two sets of federal regula-
tions promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (DHEW) and its successor, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (DHHS). The first set of regulations is 
DHHS's Protection of Human Subjects Regulations, 113 which 
apply to all biomedical and behavioral research conducted by 
DHHS or funded in whole or in part by a Department grant, 
contract, cooperative agreement, or fellowship. 114 These regula-
tions enumerate general protections for all human subjects plus 
additional safeguards for segments of the population who lack 
the capacity to give informed consent (i.e., children)115 or are 
particularly vulnerable to coercion (i.e., prisoners).116 Pregnant 
women are designated also as a class of "vulnerable" human 
subjects who are in need of special protection under these regu-
lations.117 
112. See Merton, supra note 42, at 386 (arguing that exclusionary criteria rein· 
force a cultural stereotype that is harmful to the interest and progress of women). 
113. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409 (1994). In June 
1991, the Basic DHHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, often re· 
ferred to as Subpart A, was replaced by the Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409. See Joan P. Porter, The Federal Policy for 
the Protection of Human Subjects, 13 IRB: A REviEW OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RES. 8 
(1991). This federal policy has been adopted by 16 federal agencies and departments 
and applies to research funded by or subject to regulation from any of these agen-
cies and departments. See id. The regulations provide for Institutional Review 
Boards (IRBs) to review research proposals in order to determine, in part, whether 
the investigator has complied with informed consent requirements to adequately 
protect human subjects. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.109. 
114. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101. 
115. See id. §§ 46.401-.409 (Subpart D-Additional Protections for Children In· 
volved as Subjects in Research). 
116. See id. §§ 46.301-.306 (Subpart C-Additional Protections Pertaining to Bio-
medical and Behavioral Research Involving Prisoners as Subjects). 
117. See id. §§ 46.201-.211 (Subpart B-Additional Protections Pertaining to 
Research, Development, and Related Activities Involving Fetuses, Pregnant Women, 
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The Human Subjects Regulations do not apply to privately 
funded research. A second set of federal regulations, promulgat-
ed under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 118 regu-
late privately funded human subjects research that is intended 
to introduce a new drug or medical device to the market.119 
The investigational new drug regulations control the conduct of 
clinical trials.120 The FDA regulations adopt parts of the Hu-
man Subjects Regulations, including a special section for 
protections pertaining to clinical investigations involving prison-
ers as subjects,121 but do not adopt the sections outlining spe-
cial protections for pregnant women or fetuses. It has been 
through the issuance of FDA guidelines that the participation of 
women of "childbearing potential" in clinical trials, until recent-
ly, has been severely limited.122 
The combined regulatory impact of both DHHS and FDA 
regulations is significant: federal policy governs nearly all hu-
man subjects biomedical and behavioral drug research conduct-
ed in the United States. An examination of the historical devel-
opment of federal policy follows in order to illuminate the barri-
ers to the participation of women in clinical research and to 
place these barriers in historical context. 
and Human In Vitro Fertilization). 
118. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-395 (1994). 
119. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.48, 56.101-.124, pt. 312 (1995). 
120. See id. § 50.1 (providing that the regulations apply to uclinical investiga-
tions that support applications for research or marketing permits for products regu-
lated by the [FDA]"). 
121. See id. §§ 50.40-.48. 
122. See FDA, U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, GENERAL CONSIDER-
ATIONS FOR THE CLINICAL EVALUATION OF DRUGS 15 (1977). However, the FDA an-
nounced on March 24, 1993 that it was lifting the ban on women of childbearing 
age participating in early drug trials in order to encourage study of the effects 
pharmaceuticals have on women. See Philip J. Hilts, F.D.A. Ends Ban on Vlomen in 
Drug Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at BS. Those companies who submit fund-
ing applications for clinical research trials that do not include sufficient numbers of 
women risk having their applications denied by the FDA. See id. In response to con-
cerns for protection of the fetus, the FDA's guidelines set out that women partici-
pants must give informed consent that they are aware of fetal risks inherent in the 
study and are informed of the need for taking precautions against pregnancy while 
participating in the trial. See id. Thus for the FDA, ~rotection of the fetus" consists 
of assuring that there is and will be no fetus. The question remains as to whether 
women who are pregnant will be allowed to participate in FDA supported clinical 
trials that offer treatment for the woman's health. See generally Guideline for the 
Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical Evaluation of Drugs, 58 
Fed. Reg. 39,406, 39,411 (1993) (advising that "[a]ppropriate preeautions should be 
taken . . . to guard against inadvertent exposure of fetuses to • • • toxic agents"). 
HeinOnline -- 32 Hous. L. Rev. 1220 1995-1996
1220 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1201 
A. The History of Regulating Human Subjects Research 
During the early 19th century, clinical trials depended 
largely upon experimentation with African-American slave wom-
en. 123 Anesthesia was not available, and experiments often 
. were repeated on these women to perfect methods.124 It was 
only by using slave women that researchers and physicians 
were able to experiment with various medical procedures. 125 
By the turn of the century, human research subjects were no 
longer slave women, but primarily prisoners and other institu-
tionalized populations. 126 In fact, FDA officials estimate that 
until 1972, more than 90% of all investigational drugs were 
first tested on prisoners. 127 
Spurred by abuses in the research community, protection-
ism arose, in part, because of a deeply felt need to control ex-
perimentation on humans. The public viewed experimentation 
as a threatening force rather than a gateway to better health. 
In 1949, the Nuremberg Code128 set out ethical and legal stan-
dards for the conduct of human research aimed at protecting 
human research subjects from the types of experimentation 
practices used by the Nazis in World War II.129 Despite codifi-
cation of the Code, problems persisted, and regulations were 
slow to develop in the United States.130 
123. See Ruth B. Merkatz & Suzanne W. Junod, Historical Background of 
Changes in FDA Policy on the Study and Evaluation of Drugs in Women, 69 ACAD. 
MED. 703, 705 (1994). 
124. See id. 
125. See id. 
126. See id. 
127. Id. By 1979 this percentage dropped to less than 15%. Id. 
128. See The Nuremberg Code (1949), reprinted in ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS 
AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 425 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LEVINE] 
("The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential."); see also 1 
WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 37-38 (discussing the evolution of 
the Nuremberg Code). 
129. At one of the Nuremberg Trials, numerous Nazi doctors were tried for war 
crimes, which included research atrocities. See ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT 
NUREMBERG 286 n.* (1983). The Nuremberg judges, warning that experiments on hu-
mans must be "kept within reasonable well-defined bounds," developed a set of prin-
ciples enumerating the conditions under which medical experimentation on humans 
is permissible. See LEVINE, supra note 128, at 425-26 (providing that research must 
be performed pursuant to informed, voluntary consent, that the risk imposed on the 
subject should be minimal and justified, and that either the subject or the examiner 
must be allowed to terminate the experiment at any time). Although long since 
expanded and modified, the Nuremberg Code embodies the basic legal, moral, and 
ethical limitations that protect human subjects of biomedical research. See Charles 
R. McCarthy, Historical Background of Clinical Trials Involving Women and Minori-
ties, 69 ACAD. MED. 695, 696 (1994) (describing the Nuremberg Code as a "water-
shed event" in the history of medical ethics). 
130. See McCarthy, supra note 129, at 696-97. 
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By 1953, the National Institutes of Health {NIH) estab-
lished its first scientific review panel for research involving hu-
man subjects.131 The thalidomide and diethylstilbestrol (DES) 
tragedies intensified the drive to make pregnant women specific 
targets of protectionism. 132 In part as a result of the thalido-
mide disaster, Congress passed legislation in 1962 granting the 
FDA a new charter for regulating drugs that required re-
searchers to obtain information on safety and efficacy, as well 
as informed consent from research subjects. 133 
It was not until 1966 that the U.S. Public Health Service 
issued its first policy for protection of human subjects, entitled 
Policy and Procedure Order 129.134 This policy, which had no 
regulatory teeth, continued to evolve over the ne::!l.'t five 
years.135 It soon became obvious that existing policies to pro-
tect research subjects were wholly inadequate. 
• By 1973, revelation of research abuses in the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Study gained media and congressional attention. 13!3 
During the next three years, DHEW and Congress would par-
ticipate concurrently in the development of regulations to ad-
dress human experimentation. In 1973, DHEW appointed a 
group to study "the development of special procedures for the 
use of incompetents or prisoners in biomedical research, com-
pensation of persons injured in clinical investigations, and a 
general review of the legal/ethical responsibilities in the con-
duct of such research."137 Incompetent persons and prisoners, 
but not pregnant women, were singled out for special protection. 
Later that same year, DHEW published draft regulations 
and solicited public comment.138 The draft proposed special 
protections for children, prisoners, and the mentally infirm, 133 
but the health needs of pregnant women were not addressed. 
131. See Merkatz & Junod, supra note 123, at 705. 
132. See id. at 705-06. 
133. See id. at 705. In 1962, Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962, 
Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 781 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 
U.S.C.). 
134. See McCarthy, supra note 129, at 696. 
135. See id. (referring to the Public Health Service policy as "weak. vague, full 
of loopholes, and hortatory rather than regulatory"). 
136. From 1932-73, the U.S. Public Health Service supported a study of untreat-
ed SYPhilis, enrolling 400 African-American men, many of whom remained untreated 
even after antibiotics were available. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 
3, at 34. It is worth noting that, in spite of all the attention about Tuskegee since 
then, it is rare to hear any concern about the women who were sexual partners of 
these men exposed unknowingly to syphilis. 
137. 38 Fed. Reg. 27,882 (1973). 
138. See id. at 31,738. 
139. See id. 
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Pregnant women, however, were singled out for their role as 
"fetal containers" under special categories outlining guidelines 
for "research, development, and demonstration activities" on 
abortuses and the fetus in utero. 140 Not only did the proposal 
presuppose a maternal-fetal conflict, it deemed fetal protection 
a natural corollary to regulations protecting children as a spe-
cial class: 
The fetus. Respect for the dignity of human life must not 
be compromised whatever the age, circumstance, or 
expectation of life of the individual. Therefore, all appropriate 
procedures providing protection for children as subjects in 
biomedical research must be applied with equal rigor and with 
additional safeguards to the fetus. 141 
This high level of fetal protection was deemed consistent 
with Roe u. Wade/42 which had been decided earlier that year: 
The recent decision of the Supreme Court on abortion 
does not nullify the ethical obligation to protect the developing 
fetus from avoidable harm. This obligation, along with the 
right of every women to change her decision regarding abor-
tion, requires that no experimental procedures entailing risk 
to the fetus be undertaken in anticipation of abortion.143 
As a form of supplemental protection for fetuses, the draft 
proposed that all research involving pregnant women would be 
reviewed by the Ethical Review Board, unless it was deter-
mined by the primary Review Committee that the fetus would 
not be exposed to risk.144 The draft also proposed that 
"[r]ecruitment of pregnant subjects for research ... must in-
volve the institution's Protection Committee in a manner ap-
proved by the Board, to provide supplementary judgment."145 
The pregnant women's autonomous decisionmaking was further 
eroded by a paternal consent requirement: 
The consent of both parents must be obtained for any re-
search involving the fetus, any statutes to the contrary on 
consent for abortion notwithstanding. Both the mother and the 
father have an interest in the fetus, and legal responsibility 
for it, if it is born. Therefore, the father's consent must be 
140. See id. 
141. Id. at 31,742. 
142. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
143. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,742. 
144. See id. However, the concept of a national Ethical Review Board never 
actually materialized because fetal research was such a "controversial political issue." 
See Gina Kolata, U.S. Rule on Fetal Studies Hampers Research on AZT, N.Y. TIMEs, 
Aug. 25, 1991, at A20. 
145. 38 Fed. Reg. 31,742 (emphasis added). 
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obtained for experimental procedures involving the fetus; con-
sent of the father may be waived if his identity or where-
abouts cannot be ascertained, or if he has been judged mental-
ly incompetent.146 
DHEW proposed additional regulations that included 
protections for "activities involving pregnant women where the 
fetus may be adversely affected."147 Board review would be re-
quired for all research activities that involved pregnant women, 
and research activities on pregnant women would be prohibited 
if the fetus could be harmed, unless the purpose of the research 
was to benefit that particular fetus. 148 The regulations further 
required paternal consent as well as maternal consent, if the 
father was "available and capable of participating in the con-
sent process" for activities allowable under the regulations but 
which might affect the fetus.149 
As DHEW continued to refine its proposed regulations, 
Congress continued to investigate research abuses. Days of 
testimony detailed various research abuses, including the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 150 forced sterilization cases in Mont-
gomery, Alabama/51 and the use of Depo-Provera for unap-
proved purposes and without informed consent.1G2 
As a result of the heavy response to the draft regulations 
from DHEW grantee and contracting organizations, 1ro and "co-
incidentally" with the passage of the National Research Act,154 
DHEW proposed further protective measures.1!i!i These protec-
tive measures were expressly developed to ensure that informed 
consent would be obtained from certain classes of research 
subjects deemed vulnerable.155 
Because "the majority of the more than 400 letters received 
on research with children, born and unborn, touched on one or 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 31,747. 
148. See id. 
149. Id. 
150. See Quality of Health Care-Human Experimentation, 1973: Hearings Before 
the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1187-88 (1973) (statement of Senator Edward Kennedy). 
151. See id. at 1464-66 (questioning the adequacy of consent in federally 
sponsored sterilization programs). 
152. See id. at 1314 (noting that Depo-Provera had been used in Alabama and 
Tennessee before it had been approved for general use). 
153. See 38 Fed. Reg. 30,648 (1974) (noting that 450 such responses were re-
ceived). 
154. Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342 (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
155. 39 Fed. Reg. 30,648. 
156. See id. These were proposed as Subparts B-F. 
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more aspects of research with fetuses, abortuses, and pregnant 
women,"157 DHEW proposed the addition of a new and ex-
panded Subpart entitled "Additional Protections Pertaining to 
Biomedical Research, Development, and Related Activities In-
volving Fetuses, Abortuses, Pregnant Women, and In Vitro 
Fertilization."158 While many comments received by DHEW 
objected to the research on the fetus or the pregnant woman if 
the research might harm the fetus, 159 DHEW noted that the 
absence of such research "would seriously hamper the develop-
ment of needed improvements in the health care of the preg-
nant woman, the fetus, and the newborn. "160 
The draft regulation was also criticized for the paternal 
consent provision, because a paternal consent clause: (1) could 
provide men with a veto to health care needed by the woman 
or fetus, even though the man had no marital obligations, (2) 
could delay necessary medical treatment, and (3) failed to ad-
dress the validity of consent by pregnant minors.161 As a re-
sult of the comments, DHEW altered the paternal consent pro-
vision by requiring paternal consent only if the activity was not 
responding to the health needs of the woman and the father 
was reasonably available.162 As DHEW issued these proposed 
regulations, the charter of the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects was approved by the Secretary of 
DHEW on August 23, 197 4.163 
In its mandate, the Commission was charged, in part, with 
identifying informed consent requirements for children, prison-
ers, and the institutionalized mentally ill-populations who 
were considered particularly "vulnerable" to informed consent 
abuses and coercion.164 The Commission was also charged 
with investigating research involving living fetuses.165 Inter-
estingly, women who had been victimized by forced sterilization, 
Depo-Provera, and other abuses were not designated by Con-
gress as a group requiring special informed consent protection. 
157. Id. at 30,649. 
158. Id. at 30,653. 
159. See id. at 30,649. 
160. Id. Some comments criticized the limitation on research activities involving 
pregnant women to those activities that did not adversely affect the fetus, except 
where the primary purpose of the activity was to benefit the fetus. See id. at 
30,651. These critics recommended exceptions for research necessary to meet tho 
health needs of the mother and participation in "research aimed at improvement of 
methods of abortion, birth control, and genetic intervention." Id. 
161. See id. 
162. See id. 
163. See 39 Fed. Reg. 32,172 (1974). 
164. See id. 
165. See id. 
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The Commission held public meetings and had special re-
ports and papers prepared for its review.u;s It made sih-teen 
recommendations regarding research involving fetuses.167 Two 
of the recommendations involved pregnant women: 
2. Therapeutic research directed toward the pregnant 
woman may be conducted or supported, and should be encour-
aged, by the Secretary, DHEW, provided such research (a) has 
been evaluated for possible impact on the fetus, (b) \vill place 
the fetus at risk to the minimum extent consistent ·with meet-
ing the health needs of the pregnant woman, (c) has been ap-
proved by existing review procedures with adequate provision 
for the monitoring of the consent process, and (d) the pregnant 
woman has given her informed consent. (Adopted unani-
mously.) 
3. Nontherapeutic research directed toward the pregnant 
woman may be conducted or supported by the Secretary, 
DHEW, provided such research (a) has been evaluated for 
possible impact on the fetus, (b) will impose minimal or no 
risk to the well-being of the fetus, (c) has been approved by 
existing review procedures \vith adequate provision for the 
monitoring of the consent process, (d) special care has been 
taken to assure that the woman has been fully informed re-
garding possible impact on the fetus, and (e) the woman has 
given informed consent. (Adopted unanimously.) 
It is further provided that nontherapeutic research direct-
ed at the pregnant woman may be conducted or supported (f) 
only if the father has not objected, both where abortion is not 
at issue (adopted by a vote of 8 t.o 1) and where an abortion is 
anticipated (adopted by a vote of 5 to 4).1cs 
166. See NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BID-
MEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, RE-
SEARCH ON THE FETus: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1975) [hereinafter 1975 RE-
PORT]; NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL 
& BEHAVIOR REsEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, REsEARCH ON 
THE FETus: APPENDIX (1975). 
Other publications from the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subject of Biomedical and Behavioral Research include: NATIONAL COM?J'N FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES 
AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF REsEARCH (1978); 
NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BE-
HAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S. DEP"'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BEUJO!-t'T 
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUB-
JECTS OF REsEARCH, APPENDIX VOLUME I (1978); NATIONAL C.oMM'N FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF 
HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND 
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF REsEARCH, APPENDIX VOL-
UME II (1978). 
167. See 1975 REPORT, supra note 166, at 73-76. 
168. ld. at 73. 
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However, the Commission did not recommend paternal consent 
for therapeutic research directed toward the health needs of the 
pregnant woman. 
DHEW issued the final regulations on August 8, 1975,169 
thereby officially extending "additional protections" to research 
subjects of biomedical research, development, and related activi-
ties involving, among other groups, fetuses, pregnant women, 
and in vitro fertilization.170 DHEW noted that the Commission 
drew distinctions between research directed toward the preg-
nant woman and research directed at the fetus in utero.171 
The Department found this distinction "useful" and adopted 
it.172 In commenting on the Commission's recommendations, 
DHEW agreed: 
The Commission considered that the woman's right to 
health care is preeminent, and recommended essentially no re-
strictions on research directed toward the health care of the 
pregnant woman, so long as the risks to her fetus are mini-
mized as much as possible consistent with meeting her health 
needs, and provided that she is fully advised of the risks to 
herself and her fetus. 173 
As for research directed toward the pregnant woman, but 
not for the purpose of meeting her health needs, DHEW found 
that there seemed to be "general agreement that such research 
should be permitted only if it imposes minimal or no risk to the 
fetus."174 Perhaps most significantly, DHEW admitted that dis-
agreement existed among the commentaries with respect to 
paternal consent: "The Department has considered with care 
the various arguments with respect to consent other than the 
pregnant woman's for nontherapeutic research involving the 
pregnant woman, and concludes that such consent should be ob-
tained except where such research involves the health needs of 
the woman." 175 
It further noted that, in a number of instances, the Com-
mission recommended that research should be permitted if the 
mother has consented and the father has not objected.176 The 
Department concluded that "implementation of a provision for 
169. Protection of Human Subjects, 40 Fed. Reg. 33,526 (1975) (codified as 
amended at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.409). 
170. See id. at 33,528-30 (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201-.211). 
171. See id. at 33,527. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. See id. 
175. Id. 
176. See id. 
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absence of objection might present serious problems."177 Be-
cause the absence of objection can be proven best by requesting 
consent, "the Department . . . retained the requirement for 
paternal consent when the father's identity and whereabouts 
can reasonably be ascertained, and if he is reasonably avail-
able."178 The Subpart B regulations179 were finalized and re-
main essentially unaltered.180 
The protections provided in Subpart B are in addition to 
and supplement the general provisions of Subpart A.181 Under 
Subpart B, no research activities on pregnant women or fetuses 
may be undertaken unless animal studies and studies on non-
pregnant individuals have been completed first. 182 The risk 
posed to the fetus by biomedical research must be minimal, 
except when the research activity is designed to meet the 
health needs of the particular mother or fetus.183 Invariably, 
the risk to the fetus must always be the "least possible risk for 
achieving the objectives of the activity."184 Individuals engaged 
in the activity may not participate in the decisionmaking re-
garding terminating the pregnancy, offer inducements to coerce 
the termination, or alter the procedures for terminating the 
pregnancy in ways that increase the minimal risk to the preg-
nant woman or fetus.185 
Section 46.207 of Subpart B specifically regulates research 
activities "directed toward pregnant women as subjects" and 
severely limits the participation of pregnant women in biomedi-
cal research and development by creating a two-tiered test for 
participation.186 A pregnant woman may be involved in re-
search only if: "(1) The purpose of the activity is to meet the 
health needs of the mother and the fetus will be placed at risk 
only to the minimum extent necessary to meet such needs, or 
(2) the risk to the fetus is minimal."187 
177. Id. 
178. ld. 
179. 45 C.F .R. §§ 46.201-.211. 
180. During 1994-95, a Human Subject Regulations Drafting Committee, estab-
lished by the Public Health Service, considered amending Subpart B in accordance, 
in part, with the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine's Committee on the 
Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in Clinical Studies. 
Refer to Part V infra. To date, no final action has been taken on the Drafting 
Committee's recommendation. 
181. See generally Porter, supra note 113, at 8-9 (discussing the history of 
Subpart A). 
182. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(a)(1). 
183. See id. § 46.206(a)(2). 
184. ld. 
185. See id. § 46.206(a)(3).(4), (b). 
186. Id. § 46.207. 
187. Id. § 46.207(a) (emphasis added). ''Minimal risk" is not specifically defined 
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If the research activity survives this initial threshold test 
for participation, the activity then may be conducted only if the 
mother and father188 are legally competent and have given 
their informed consent after receiving complete information 
regarding the possible impact on the fetus.189 The reputed 
father's informed consent is not necessary if: "(1) The purpose 
of the activity is to meet the health needs of the mother; (2) his 
identity or whereabouts cannot reasonably be ascertained; (3) 
he is not reasonably available; or ( 4) the pregnancy resulted 
from rape."190 
The concept of "health needs of the mother" is not defined 
under the regulations, and as a practical matter, it may be very 
difficult to sort out when a proposed activity is to meet the 
health needs of the mother, fetus, or both. This lack of clarity 
may be quite significant because section 46.208 sets out differ-
ent standards of paternal consent for activities directed toward 
fetuses in utero.191 Under these circumstances, the reputed 
father's consent is required unless "(1) His identity or where-
abouts cannot reasonably be ascertained, (2) he is not 
in Subpart B, but in the general provisions it is defined to mean risks not greater, 
considering probability and magnitude, "than those ordinarily encountered in daily 
life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or 
tests." Id. § 46.102(i). 
188. The term "father" is not defined under the regulations. In fact, it may be 
totally premature to label a sexual partner a father in this context. "Parental rights 
do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. 
They require relationships more enduring. The mother carries and bears the child, 
and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's pa-
rental claims must be gauged by other measures." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 
380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
Some of the measures courts use to analyze paternal rights in respect to chil-
dren (not fetuses) include marital status, paternity testing and paternal acknowledg-
ment, the degree of participation in the child's life, and the best interest of tho 
child. See, e.g., Sider v. Sider, 639 A2d 1076, 1083-86 (Md. 1994) (listing as factors 
that must be balanced in a custody case the establishment of paternity: availability 
of a family unit, the child's relationship with the parties, and the best interest of 
the child); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994) (analyzing a biological 
father's paternal acknowledgment and commitment to parental duties to determine 
his parental rights). When the family law of the various states considers paternal 
claims over rearing of existing children, father may be defined very broadly. For 
example, under New York State law, in addition to men listed in the state's puta-
tive father directory, notice of an adoption proceeding must be given to several other 
classes of possible fathers of children born out of wedlock, including those the moth-
er identifies as the father in a sworn written statement. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 
u.s. 248, 251 (1983). . 
189. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(b). 
190. See id. 
191. See id. § 46.208(a). Experiments on the fetus in utero are limited to re-
search to meet the needs of the fetus or research in which the risk is minimal and 
the purpose is the "development of important biomedical knowledge which cannot bo 
obtained by other means." ld. 
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reasonably available, or (3) the pregnancy resulted from 
rape."192 These artificial distinctions in this context result in 
regulatory frustration and the perpetuation of the presumption 
that a pregnant woman cannot decide what is best either for 
her or her fetus.193 
It is incongruous that the paternal consent requirements in 
Subpart B194 have remained in place while DHHS regulations 
on research involving children195 only require the permission 
of one parent when such research poses either no greater than 
minimal risk or the prospect of direct benefit to the child.196 
Although the permission of both parents generally is required 
for all other forms of research on children, the consent of only 
one parent will be sufficient if the other parent is deceased, un-
known, incompetent, or not reasonably available, or when only 
one parent maintains legal responsibility for the care and custo-
dy of the child.197 Subpart B and its "special" treatment of 
pregnant women would become symbolic of the regulatory barri-
ers to research that still remain. 
B. A New Era for Inclusion of Women in Clinical Research 
The changing view of participation in clinical trials as a 
benefit rather than a burden provided the momentum of the 
192. Id. § 46.208(b). 
193. For example, consider the ACTG 076 trial, "A Phase ill Randomized Place-
bo-Controlled Trial to Evaluate the Efficacy, Safety and Tolerance of Zidovudine 
[ZDV] for the Prevention of Maternal-Fetal HIV Transmission." Tbe goal of the trial 
was to measure the effect of ZDV in reducing vertical transmission from mother to 
fetus. Tbe inclusion criteria for the study eliminated those women with CD4 cell 
counts below 200, those women most sick with AIDS. In addition, there was no 
planned long-term follow up for the women who did participate in the trial. Thus, in 
a clinical trial that allowed for the study of the effects of ZDV in pregnant women, 
the focus actually appeared to be on the fetus. Characterized in this way then, pa-
ternal consent was required for research on the fetus (and the pregnant woman) 
absent the regulatory exceptions found in 45 C.F.R. § 46.208. 
194. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207(b), 46.208(b), 46.209(d). 
195. Id. §§ 46.401-.409. 
196. See id. §§ 46.404, 46.405, 46.408. Pursuant to § 46.408, the permission of 
both parents is required for research involving greater than minimal risk and no 
prospect of direct benefit, but likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the 
subject's disorder or condition. See id. § 46.40S(b). Research not otherwise npprovable 
that presents an opportunity to understand, prevent, or alleviate a serious problem 
affecting the health or welfare of children also requires permission from both par-
ents. See id. Tbe Commission did not explain its inconsistency in position with re-
spect to parental consent. It is worth noting, however, that the Commission studied 
fetal protection under political pressure and, as they admitted, at a hurried pace. 
See 1975 REPORT, supra note 166, at 61 (noting that the Commission was "placed 
under severe limitations of time by its Congressional mandate"). 
197. 45 C.F.R. § 46.408(b). 
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movement toward increased inclusion of women in clinical re-
search. Beginning with AIDS research, the focus of public at-
tention regarding clinical trials turned toward access rather 
than protection.198 As AIDS activists cried out for improved 
access, the public began to realize the numerous advantages 
afforded to research participants.199 These include possible 
therapeutic advantages when other treatments are inadequate, 
close monitoring of the disease, attention for other ailments, 
superior physicians, labs, and testing, more contact with the 
providers, remunerations, and contributions to society.200 
Exclusionary gender policies and regulatory barriers to 
research have consequently fallen prey to serious scrutiny. In 
1983, the U.S. Public Health Service appointed a task force to 
address women's health issues. As noted earlier, its 1985 Re-
port concluded that there were significant deficiencies in bio-
medical research addressing women's health needs: "'The his-
torical lack of research focus on women's health concerns has 
compromised the quality of health information available to 
women as well as the health care they receive."'201 The NIH 
would now have to take action. 
1. NIH Policy: From Encouragement to Requirement. In 
1986, NIH issued and implemented guidelines urging funding 
applicants to include women in clinical research and requiring a 
clear rationale if women were to be excluded.202 In 1990, a 
General Accounting Office (GAO) report203 confirmed that 
women were not sufficiently represented in clinical trials. More 
specifically, the GAO found that: the policy on women had not 
been well-communicated or understood within NIH or the re-
search community; there were inconsistencies in how the policy 
had been applied in key stages of the grant review process; 
NIH officials had taken little action to encourage researchers to 
analyze study results by gender; and NIH had no way to mea-
sure the policy's impact on its research, including its effect on 
198. See Merton, supra note 42, at 377 (noting the desire of research subjects to 
receive access to experimental drugs and therapies). 
199. See id. (reporting the battle cry of AIDS advocates: "(T]rials are treat· 
ment"). 
200. See id. at 379. 
201. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 43 (citing Task Force 
Report, supra note 1). 
202. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 15 NIH GUIDE FOR GRANTS AND 
CONTRACTS 1 (1986). The 1986 NIH policy applied to extramural research projects 
only and not to NIH's own intramural research projects. See id. at 1. 
203. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: 
PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING POLICY ON WOMEN IN STUDY POPULATIONS (1990). 
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the demographic composition of study populations.2(H 
Consequently, by the fall of 1990, NIH announced criteria 
for the awarding of research grants, through a series of memo-
randa and notices, that required the inclusion of women and 
minorities in NIH-supported intramural and extramural re-
search.205 The new policy distinguished between extramural 
grants awarded to institutions and individuals outside of NIH 
and intramural grants awarded to investigators at the NIH. 
Extramural grants awarded to conduct human subjects research 
were required to include minorities as well as both genders, 
except in those cases where the grant applicant could provide 
"compelling justification" for exclusion.200 Compelling justifica-
tion was defined as "strong scientific or practical reasons for 
exclusion, "207 including an "unacceptable risk for women of 
childbearing age. ~08 NIH intramural researchers could exclude 
women where there was a "clear rationale" for doing so,m in-
cluding where involvement of pregnant women "may expose the 
fetus to undue risks. "210 This policy remained in effect until 
June 10, 1993, when the National Institutes of Health Revital-
ization Act of 1993211 was signed into law.212 
The NIH Revitalization Act mandates that the Director of 
Nlli "ensure" that both women and minority groups be included 
in both intramural and extramural research funded by NIH.213 
204. See id. at summary (statement of Mark V. Nadel, Associate Director, GAO). 
205. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, INSTRUCTION AND INFORMATION MEMo-
RANDUM OER 90-5: NIH GUIDANCE ON THE INCLUSION OF l\fiNORITIES AND WOMEN 
IN CLINICAL REsEARCH STUDY POPULATIONS (1990) (on file with the Houston Law 
Review). 
206. ld. at 1. 
207. The Memorandum OER 90-5 provided that acceptable justifications may 
include research on a "predominantly or exclusively ..• male condition," certain 
pilot and feasibility studies in which "[g]ender differences may not be germane," re-
search in an area that "has already been extensively studied in women," and in cer-
tain instances, studies that would be "prohibitively expensive." I d. at 30. 
208. ld. 
209. Memorandum from Edward Rall, Deputy Director of Intramural Research, 
National Institutes of Health, Policy on Inclusion of Women in Study Population 
(Aug. 1, 1990) (on file with the Houston Law Review). 
210. Id. 
211. Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (1993) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
212. Legislation to mandate the inclusion of women in clinical research also was 
proposed during the 1991-92 session of Congress. See LAURENCE & WEINHOUSE, 
supra note 10, at 68 (discussing the NIH Revitalization Amendments of 1991). The 
legislation passed both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but was vetoed 
by President Bush because of controversial provisions that lifted the moratorium on 
federally funded fetal tissue transplantation research. See id. The Revitalization Act 
of 1993 was signed by President Clinton and became Jaw on June 10, 1993. See id. 
213. Pub. L. No. 103-43, sec. 131, § 429B(a)(1)(A), 107 Stat. 122, 133. In addi-
tion, the Act statutorily authorized the Office on Women's Health within the Office 
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On March 28, 1994, NIH issued guidelines pursuant to the Act 
that strengthened its prior policy on inclusion in several re-
spects.214 Specifically, they: 
• define clinical research to include all research involving 
human subjects;215 
• direct that women and members of minority 
subpopulations be included in all human subjects re-
search·216 
' 
• require inclusion of women and minorities and their 
subpopulations in Phase III clinical trials such that 
valid analyses of differences in intervention effect can 
be accomplished;217 
• promote development of outreach programs to recruit 
women and minorities and their subpopulations into 
clinical studies;218 and 
of the Director of Nlli, see id. § 486(o), 107 Stat. at 136; required NIH to establish 
internal and external committees to advise it on issues in women's health research, 
including gender differences in clinical drug trials and disease etiology, course, and 
treatment, see id. § 486(d)(4)(A), 107 Stat. at 137; required NIH to determine the 
extent of women's representation among senior physicians and scientists conducting 
NIH·supported research and to carry out activities to increase the extent of such 
representation, see id. § 486(e), 107 Stat. at 138; and finally, mandated the estab-
lishment of a national data system and clearinghouse on research of women's health, 
see id. § 486A(a), (b) 107 Stat. at 138. 
Under the Act, the entire scientific community shares the responsibility for 
fulfilling the intent of the law and ensuring that the results of research are broadly 
applicable. Principal investigators assess the theoretical or scientific links between 
gender, race, ethnicity, and their topic of study in preparing their applications. See 
59 Fed. Reg. 14,508, 14,510 (1994). Institutional Review Boards review Nlli protocols 
in terms of the NIH inclusion policy during their review for protection of human 
subjects. See id. Peer review groups include a scientific and technical merit evalua· 
tion of the inclusion plan and assign appropriate scores for the award of grants. See 
id. Finally, the advisory council or board of each institute or center prepares reports 
describing the manner in which the institute or center has complied with the provi· 
sions of the statute. See id.; see also NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, QUESTIONS 
AND ANSWERS CONCERNING THE 1994 Nlli GUIDELINES ON THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN 
AND MINORITIES AS SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH 8-13 (1994) [hereinafter NIH Q 
& A] (providing information to the scientific community concerning the scope of the 
policy, applicable definitions of "minorities," and compliance regulations). 
214. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508. 
215. See id. 
216. See id. Although it is very significant that minorities and their 
subpopulations are recruited into clinical studies, this analysis is limited to the in· 
cluding of women. For a discussion of the importance of inclusion minorities and 
subpopulations, see generally 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 
114-19; Dresser, supra note 12, at 24. 
217. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508. 
218. See id. In addition to numerous educational programs for the scientific com· 
munity, ORWH has prepared an Outreach Notebook for the NIH Guidelines on the 
Inclusion of Women and Minorities as Subjects in Clinical Research. See NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, OUTREACH NOTEBOOK FOR THE Nlli GUIDELINES ON INCLU· 
SION OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES AS SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (1994). It has 
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• do not allow cost as an acceptable reason for excluding 
these groups in clinical trials.219 
All biomedical and behavioral research, including small 
scale (i.e., Phase I and II), exploratory, or observational studies, 
as well as large scale studies, falls within the definition of 
"clinical research."220 The policy extends to all research involv-
ing the use of human organs, tissues, and body fluids from 
living individuals and to graphic, written, or recorded informa-
tion derived from living individuals.221 Even research that is 
exempt from Institutional Review Board (IRB) review is not 
exempt from NIH policies on the inclusion of both genders in 
study populations.222 
Although the inclusion of women is required in all phases 
of clinical research, it is only for Phase ill clinical trials that 
the guidelines require the performance of valid analysis223 of 
clinically important gender differences in response to the 
intervention. 224 The NIH defines a clinical trial as 
a broadly based prospective Phase ill clinical investigation, 
usually involving several hundred or more human subjects, for 
the purpose of evaluating an experimental intervention in 
comparison with a standard or control intervention or com-
paring two or more existing treatments. . . . The definition in-
cludes pharmacologic, non-pharmacologic, and behavioral inter-
ventions given for disease prevention, prophylaxis, diagnosis, 
also held public hearings and published its report on improving the recruitment and 
retention of women in clinical trials. OFFICE OF REsEARCH ON WOMEN'S HEALTH, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION OF WOMEN IN CLIN-
ICAL STUDIES (1994). 
219. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508. 
220. Nlli Q & A. supra note 213, at 10. The policy is based on the definition 
for human subjects in the federal regulations: "a living individlllll about whom an 
investigator (whether professional or student) conducting research obtains: (1) Data 
through intervention or interaction with the individual, or (2) Identifiable private 
information." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(0. 
221. See Nlli Q & A. supra note 213, at 11; see also Judith LaRosa et al., In-
cluding Women and Minorities in Clinical Research, 4 APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALs 31, 
32 (1995) (noting that the "rationale for such a broad definition [of research] is to 
detect trends of potential gender, racial, and ethnic differences by obtaining the 
greatest possible amount of information from the earliest stages of scientific inqui-
ry"). 
222. See Nlli Q & A. supra note 213, at 10. The guidelines, however, do not re-
quire IRBs to review research that is exempt. For example, pursuant to 45 C.F .R. 
§ 46.101(b)(3), research involving the use of educational tests, certain research and 
demonstration projects, and food quality studies are exempt from IRB review. See id. 
223. Valid analysis is defined as an assessment that will, on average, provide 
the correct estimate of the difference in outcomes between the groups of subjects. 
See Nlli Q & A. supra note 213, at 13. 
224. See 59 Fed. Reg. 14,508. 
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or therapy. Community trials and other population-based in-
tervention trials are also included.225 
The objective of such investigation is "to provide evidence lead-
ing to a scientific basis for consideration of a change in health 
policy or standard of care. "226 This definition is much broader 
than the FDA definition of Phase III clinical trials, which focus-
es primarily on clinical investigation of drugs, vaccines, and 
biological and medical devices.227 
In designing a Phase III clinical trial, the principal investi-
gator must comply with the following standards for valid analy-
sis of gender differences: if the data strongly indicate the exis-
tence of significant differences or are inconclusive about poten-
tial differences, the principal investigator will be required to 
include sufficient and appropriate recruitment of both genders 
in the study design.228 If the data generated from earlier stud-
ies strongly support no significant differences, then inclusion is 
not required, but is "still strongly encouraged. "229 
Pursuant to the Act, women may be excluded from all 
phases of a clinical research project if inclusion is "'inappropri-
ate with respect to the health of the subjects,'" is "'inappropri-
ate with respect to the purpose of the research,'" or is "'inap-
propriate under such other circumstances as the Director of 
Nlli may designate.' "230 By example, NIH has stated that 
225. Id. at 14,511. 
226. Id. 
227. See NIH Q & A, supra note 213, at 11 (citing the FDA definition of Phase 
III trials as only expanded, controlled, and uncontrolled trials). Phase III trials are 
performed after preliminary evidence suggesting effectiveness of the drug has been 
obtained. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21. They are intended to gather the additional infor-
mation about the effectiveness and safety required to evaluate overall benefit-risk 
relationship of the drug and to provide an adequate basis for physician labeling. See 
id. 
228. See NIH Q & A, supra note 213, at 12-13. It is only in the case where 
data strongly indicates the existence of significant differences that the trial must be 
designed with high statistical power of the intervention effect in the separate gen· 
ders. See id. For example, if men and women are thought to respond differently to 
an intervention, then the Phase III trial must be designed to answer two separate 
primary questions, one for men and the other for women, with adequate sample size 
for each. See id. at 12. 
229. Id. at 13. Thus, it may be to the benefit of researchers to collect data by 
gender in the early phases of clinical research because gender analysis need not be 
performed nor will gender be required as subject selection criteria if the data 
strongly support no significant differences of clinical or public health importance in 
intervention effect between genders. 
230. National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43 
sec. 131, § 492B(b), 107 Stat. 122, 134. NIH has delineated a number of examples of 
possible acceptable justifications, including the following instances: 
o One gender (male or female) may be excluded from a study because: 
• inclusion of these individuals would be inappropriate with 
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"experimental procedures/treatments . . . [that pose an] unac-
ceptable risk for women of childbearing potential" may be a 
possible acceptable justification for excluding women from a 
clinical study.231 This justification is carried over from earlier 
Nlli policy,232 in spite of the fact that the guidelines expressly 
recognize that "[ w ]omen of childbearing potential should not be 
routinely excluded from participation in clinical research. n233 
Although "inappropriateness" may sometimes justify exclu-
sion, the Act clearly states that, contrary to former Nlli policy, 
cost will not be deemed an acceptable reason for excluding 
women in clinical trials.2J.I Many researchers and 
respect to their health (e.g., experimentnl proce-
dures/treatments present unacceptable risk for women of 
childbearing potential. It should be noted however, that 
women of childbearing potential should not be routinely 
excluded.); 
o the research question addressed is relevant to only one 
gender; or 
o evidence from prior research strongly demonstrates no 
difference between genders; or 
o sufficient data already exist with regard to the outcome of 
comparable studies in the excluded gender, and duplica-
tion is not needed in this study. 
o One gender is excluded or severely limited because the purpose of the 
research constrains the applicant's selection of study subjects by gen-
der (e.g., uniquely valuable stored specimens or existing dntasets nrc 
single gender; very small numbers of subjects nrc involved; or 
overriding factors dictate selection of subjects, such ns matching of 
transplant recipients, or availability of rare surgical specimens.) 
o Gender representation of specimens or existing dntasets cannot be 
accurately determined, e.g., pooled blood samples, stored specimens, or 
datasets with incomplete gender documentation nrc used, AND this 
does not compromise the scientific objectives of the research. 
• The scientific question requires the use of the snme or n comparable 
study population as that used in an earlier study and the potentinl 
gain in scientific knowledge outweighs the imbalance in the study 
population. 
o Research is proposed with a pre-defined unique but underrepresented 
population (e.g., an extensive registry of patients with the condition of 
interest) and would not be feasible if a different sample were used. 
Each of these justifications would be evaluated by Initial Review Groups in 
the context of the specific scientific goals and issues being addressed. De-
pending on the details, these justifications may or may not be considered 
adequate and compelling. 
NIH Q & A, supra note 213, at 25-26. 
231. Id. at 25. 
232. Refer to notes 205-12 supra and accompanying te.'tt. 
233. 59 Fed. Reg. 14,509. On September 15, 1995, the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC) published its own Policy on the Inclusion of Women and 
Racial and Ethnic :Minorities in Externally Awarded Research. See 60 Fed. Reg. 
47,947 (1995). It states that "women of childbearing potential should also not be 
routinely and/or arbitrarily excluded from participation even though there nrc ethi-
cal/risk issues to consider for inclusion and exclusion.a Id. at 47,949. 
234. See Pub. L. No. 103-43, sec. 131 § 429B(d)(2)(A)(i), 107 Stat. 122, 134. In 
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policymakers have expressed concern about the implications of 
this provision.235 If priority goes to costly "inclusive" projects, 
critics have warned the NIH will be limited to funding fewer 
studies.236 Moreover, experts have warned that "if the act is 
too rigidly interpreted, it will make costly and unreasonable de-
mands on the scientific research process and impede the imple-
mentation of its noble goal."237 
On March 28, 1995, the one year comment period to re-
spond to the NIH guidelines ended.238 A number of respon-
dents expressed serious concern about the cost of expanding 
clinical trials to meet the inclusion requirements, particularly 
with respect to minority groups and their subpopulations. 239 
The statutory mandate, however, was explicit that "'cost is not 
a permissible consideration'" and does not authorize the NIH 
guidelines to provide otherwise. 240 The more germane question 
may well be "'What is the cost of not including women and 
minorities?' "241 
2. FDA Policy: From Exclusion to Encouragement. The 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates privately funded 
addition, cost is not an acceptable reason for exclusion in other types of clinical 
research except when the study would duplicate data from other sources. See 59 
Fed. Reg. 14,509. 
235. See, e.g., Sally L. Satel, Science by Quota, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 1995, at 
14, 14 (arguing that the regulations inappropriately allow "politicians to dictate how 
scientists must do their work" and that "[b]y the time a diligent researcher has 
ensured that adequate numbers of minorities participate [in studies], . . . the size 
and price tag of the grant proposal will skyrocket"). 
236. See id. at 16. See generally Marcia Angell, Caring for Women's 
Health-What is the Problem?, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 271, 271-72 (1993) (concluding 
that "[y]es, women should be included more often in clinical trials, but not according 
to a formula that would make clinical trials more difficult than ever and probably 
be counterproductive in terms of learning about differential effects in women"); J. 
Claude Bennett, Inclusion of Women in Clinical Trials-Policies for Population Sub-
groups, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 288, 291 (1993) (maintaining that the "global solu-
tion" of the NIH Revitalization Act "cannot provide the answers to complex and 
varied questions about the effects of therapy on women"). 
237. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 3. 
238. Most of the public comments received focused on the inclusion requirements 
for minority groups and their subpopulations, expressing concern about the difficul· 
ties in recruiting sufficient numbers, particularly in certain geographic regions. See 
Eugene Hayunga, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH POLICY AND GUIDE· 
LINES ON THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN (AND MINORITIES) AS SUBJECTS IN CLINICAL RE· 
SEARCH 4-5 (1995) (unpublished document) (on file with the Houston Law Review). 
While some concerns resulted from a misunderstanding of the requirement, others 
reflected the need for enhanced outreach activities and improved scientific collabora· 
tion. See id. at 4. 
239. See id. 
240. Id. 
241. ld. 
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human subjects research that is intended to introduce a new 
drug or medical device to the market.2~2 The FDA's policy on 
the inclusion of women in clinical trials is set forth in guide-
lines. These guidelines are not mandatory interpretations of 
FDA regulations, but rather "advisory opinions on an acceptable 
approach to meeting regulatory requirements, and research 
begun in good faith under such guidelines will be accepted by 
the Agency for review purposes unless the guideline (or the 
relevant portion of it) has been formally rescinded for valid 
health reasons."243 
In its 1977 Guidelines, the FDA largely excluded women of 
childbearing potential from clinical trials: 
In general, women of childbearing potential should be exclud-
ed from the earliest dose ranging studies. If adequate infor-
mation on efficacy and relative safety has been amassed dur-
ing Phase II, women of childbearing potential may be included 
in further studies provided Segment II and the female part of 
Segment I of the FDA Animal Reproduction Guidelines have 
been completed. All three Segments should be completed be-
fore large-scale clinical trials are initiated in women of child-
bearing potential.2« 
Although the 1977 FDA Guidelines largely excluded women 
from clinical trials, they did provide for three exceptional cir-
cumstances. Women of childbearing potential could undergo 
experimental drug testing if: (1) the purpose of the drug was to 
save or prolong life, (2) the drug belonged to a class of com-
pounds for which teratogenic potential had already been estab-
lished in animals, or (3) institutionalization of the woman had 
allowed investigators to verify that she was not pregnant.2.c; 
What is noteworthy in these guidelines is the language 
used both to "protect" and exclude women from clinical trials. 
Women of childbearing potential "may" be included if prior 
242. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360. 
243. FDA, U.S. DEP'r OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
FOR THE CLINICAL EvALUATION OF DRUGS 5 (1977} [hereinafter 1977 GUIDELINES). 
A woman of childbearing potential is defined as a premenopausal female 
capable of becoming pregnant. This includes women on orol, ilijectable, or 
mechanical contraception; women who are single; [and] women whose hus-
bands have been vasectomized or whose husbands have received or are uti-
lizing mechanical contraceptive devices. Women in certain institutions, e.g., 
prisions [sic], although of childbearing potential, could be considered as not 
in the appropriate environment to become pregnant during the administra-
tion of an investigational drug. However, women in mental institutions could 
become pre~t. 
Id. at 15. 
244. Id. 
245. See id. 
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animal studies have been completed. Also, all three segments 
"should" be completed before allowing women of childbearing 
potential to participate. In fact, prior animal reproduction stud-
ies are not required prior to Phase II and Phase III clinical 
trials, and FDA regulations stipulate that nonclinical studies 
are to be performed "as appropriate" for reproductive and fetal 
effects.246 The FDA allows drug manufacturers to market 
drugs without reproductive testing, as long as notice of this fact 
is included in the product label.247 
The 1977 Guidelines briefly addressed the FDA's position 
on male reproductive effects: 
Where testicular abnormalities or abnormalities of spermato-
genesis have occurred in experimental animals or where chro-
mosomal abnormalities are anticipated (e.g., alkylating 
agents), the criteria for inclusion of males in Phase I, II and 
III depend upon the nature of the abnormalities, the dosage at 
which they occurred, the disease being treated, the importance 
of the drug, and the duration of the drug administration. In 
some cases, special written consent forms, even in Phases III, 
may be required. 248 
What is noteworthy about these earlier guidelines is the 
risk/benefit approach for inclusion of males, even when male 
reproductive abnormalities may result from the drug. Whereas 
women of childbearing potential can be excluded wholesale from 
early clinical trials for the purpose of protecting the fetus, the 
presence of documented harm is not sufficient to exclude males 
with equal potential for childbearing. Rather, it is the degree of 
harm that determines whether a male will be included in a 
given clinical trial. 
The practical result of the 1977 Guidelines was that drugs 
could be marketed without ever being tested on women. Ironi-
cally, the FDA could approve drugs, the toxicity of which was 
unknown in women and fetuses, for use on the very populations 
it sought to protect-pregnant women and women of childbear-
ing potential.249 Moreover, by following FDA guidelines and 
attempting to "protect" women of childbearing potential (and 
246. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 137. 
247. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(b)(i)(c) (1995). 
248. 1977 GUIDELINES, supra note 243, at 16. 
249. See Merton, supra note 42, at 381-82 (observing that researchers bar al-
most all fertile women from research, but "when it comes time to prescribe, market, 
and profit from drugs, drug companies do not bar women, including women of child-
bearing capacity"). Merton notes that the researchers avoid responsibility for this 
apparent double standard by truthfully asserting that they have no information 
about the possible risks of the drug to pregnant women or fetuses. See id. at 382. 
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themselves from liability for research injuries), drug manufac-
turers could find themselves exposed to even greater potential 
liability should the adverse affects of a drug be discovered after 
it was marketed to the general public. 260 
The 1977 Guidelines were considered by many to reflect 
gender stereotyping more than concerns about good science.2:n 
In 1992, at the urging of women's health advocacy groups, the 
Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues requested a GAO 
audit of the FDA As expected, the GAO found that women 
were underrepresented in drug trials, especially in the earliest 
stages of new drug research.252 As a result of the GAO audit 
and public pressure, the FDA issued a new guideline in 1993 
for the inclusion of women in drug research. 
The FDA's 1993 Guideline, entitled "Guideline for the 
Study and Evaluation of Gender Differences in the Clinical 
Evaluation of Drugs,"253 loosened many of the restrictions it 
formerly had imposed on researchers and lifted the blanket ban 
on the inclusion of women of childbearing potential in new drug 
research.254 FDA policy now was beginning to move in the 
same direction of NIH policy on the inclusion of women.255 
The 1993 Guideline provides that sponsors are expected to 
250. Refer to Part IV infra. 
251. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 138 (citing Ehin L. 
Kinney et al., Underrepresentation of Women in New Drug Trials, 95 ANNALs Iz-.."rER-
NAL MED. 495 (1981)). 
252. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 203, at 2-3. 
253. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,406 (1993). 
254. See id. at 39,408. The FDA's intent in loosening its restrictions was to 
"remove the unnecessary Federal impediment to inclusion of women in the earliest 
stages of drug development." Id. In the background paper accomp:m)ing the 1993 
Guideline, the FDA explained that the 1977 Guidelines may have "discouraged par-
ticipation of women in drug development studies and may have resulted in a 'pauci-
ty of information about the effects of drugs in women.'" 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH 
REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 138-39 (citation omitted). 
255. The FDA also acknowledged that its 1977 Guidelines were inconsistent with 
current policies prohibiting gender discrimination as interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court in UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). In Johnson 
Controls, the Court held that excluding all women, except those whose infertility was 
medically documented, from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure exceed-
ing OSHA guidelines was facially discriminatory and in violation of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. Id. at 211. The FDA maintained that removal of the prohibition on par-
ticipation of women of child-bearing potential in Phase I and early Phase ll trials is 
consistent with congressional efforts, laid out in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
and interpreted in Johnson Controls, to prevent unwarranted discrimination against 
such women. See 58 Fed. Reg. 39,408; Ruth Merkntz et al., Vlomen in Clinical Tri-
als of New Drugs: A Change in Food and Drug Administration Policy, 329 NEW 
ENG. J. !\fED. 292, 295 (1993) (maintaining that congressional action and Supreme 
Court decisions suggest that women should have the right to make their own risk-
benefit choices about their pregnancies). For an in-depth discussion of the ethical 
and policy implications of Johnson Controls, refer to subpart IV(A). 
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include a full range of patients in their studies,256 to carry out 
appropriate analyses to evaluate potential subset differences in 
the patients they have studied, 257 to study possible 
pharmacokinetic differences in patient subsets, 258 and to carry 
out targeted studies to look for subset pharmacodynamic differ-
ences that are especially probable, suggested by existing data, 
or that would be particularly important if present.259 Consis-
tent with its historical concern for fetal protection, the FDA 
also made clear that "[a]ppropriate precautions should be taken 
in clinical studies to guard against inadvertent exposure of fe-
tuses to potentially toxic agents and to inform subjects and pa-
tients of potential risk and the need for precautions. "260 What 
is new is the FDA's recognition that women, including those of 
childbearing potential, "are competent to give informed consent 
to their participation in research trials, and that this informed 
consent provides the necessary insulation to protect researcher 
and manufacturer from suit by mother or possible child for all 
but negligent enrollment practices."261 
Unfortunately, the 1993 Guideline has exceptions and other 
provisions that render it potentially weak. For example, the 
FDA undermines its own guidance that gender analyses be 
performed by stating that its recommendations need not always 
be followed. 262 In addition, the 1993 Guideline would not bar 
256. "The patients included in clinical studies should, in general, reflect the 
population that will receive the drug when it is marketed. For most drugs, therefore, 
representatives of both genders should be included in clinical trials in numbers ade· 
quate to allow detection of clinically significant gender-related differences in drug re-
sponse." 58 Fed. Reg. 39,410. 
257. "Analyses to detect the influence of gender should be carried out both for 
individual studies and the overall integrated analyses of effectiveness and safety." Id. 
258. 
Using either a specific pharmacokinetic study or a pharmacokinetic screen, 
the pharmacokinetics of a drug should be defined for both genders. . . . 
Three pharmacokinetic issues related specifically to women that should 
be considered during drug development are: (1) The influence of menstrual 
status on the drug's pharmacokinetics, including both comparisons of pre-
menopausal and postmenopausal patients and examination of within-cycle 
changes; (2) the influence of concomitant supplementary estrogen treatment 
or systemic contraceptives (oral contraceptives, long-acting progesterone) on 
the drug's pharmacokinetics; and (3) the influence of the drug on the phar· 
macokinetics of oral contraceptives. 
ld. at 39,410-11. 
259. "Evidence of [pharmacodynamic] differences should be sought, however, in 
the data from clinical trials by carrying out the by-gender analyses suggested in the 
guideline on the clinical and statistical sections of NDA's." Id. at 39,411. 
260. Id. 
261. R. Alta Charo, Protecting Us to Death: Women, Pregnancy, and Clinical 
Research Trials, 38 ST. LOUIS L.J. 135, 158 (1993). 
262. See 58 Fed. Reg. 39,408 (observing that "at this time [the FDA does not] 
perceive a regulatory basis for requiring routinely that women in general or women 
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a study protocol that required surgical sterilization for women 
of childbearing potential, nor does it prohibit sponsors from ex-
cluding women of childbearing potential without evidence of 
fetal toxicity.263 And, as under the 1977 Guidelines, Phase I 
testing in human subjects may begin prior to the completion of 
animal reproduction studies, thus restricting the right of both 
women and men to be fully informed of the potential reproduc-
tive risks of the therapy they are to receive.~ 
The FDA also failed to set forth its policy in regulation. 
The 1993 Guideline, therefore, does not have the force of law; it 
merely communicates recommended procedures to organizations 
who wish to market new drugs. Despite its recognition that the 
"change in FDA's policy will not, by itself, cause drug compa-
nies or IRB's to alter restrictions they might impose on the 
participation of women of childbearing potential, ,.,..65 the FDA 
nonetheless refrained from mandating the inclusion of women. 
The FDA rationalized that it was "confident that the interplay 
of ethical, social, medical, legal and political forces will allow 
greater participation of women in the early stages of clinical 
trials"266 and would not require inclusion of women in trials 
particularly routinely.267 The FDA's 1993 Guideline concluded 
with the following disclaimer: "This guideline does not bind the 
agency, and it does not create or confer any rights, privileges, 
or benefits for or on any person.n268 Only time will tell wheth-
er or not the FDA is right. 
of childbearing potential be included in particular trials"). 
263. See 59 Fed. Reg. 39,406. 
264. The 1993 Guideline states that u[i)f no relevant information is available, 
the informed consent should explicitly note the potential for fetal risk." 58 Fed. Reg. 
39,411. This provision may allow trial sponsors to place special conditions on the en· 
rollment of women even when no analysis of reproductive effects has been under-
taken. By allowing, if not encouraging, trial sponsors to do so, the FDA has substan-
tially weakened the informed consent process and is, in effect, "in violation of its 
own duty to investigate the risk of adverse reproductive effects." THEREsA 
MCGoVERN, PROPOSAL TO ELThfiNATE OBSTACLES FACING WOMEN IN THE DRUG DE-
VELOPMENT PRocESS 21 (1994) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Houston 
Law Reuiew). Further, because male-mediated reproductive effects need not be stud-
ied prior to human subjects testing, even though "special conditions" are not placed 
on their enrollment in clinical trials, men, too, are deprived of their right to be fully 
informed of potential reproductive risks. See id. 
265. 58 Fed. Reg. 39,408. 
266. Id. at 39,408-09. 
267. Id. at 39,408. 
268. Id. at 39,409. 
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IV. ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
Denying women access to clinical research and treatment 
raises questions of gender discrimination in the context of both 
statutory and constitutional law. Generally, the Supreme Court 
has affirmed women's rights to decisionmaking regarding behav-
iors that affect reproductive status.269 To date, however, there 
is little, if any, case law on the legal issues raised by clinical 
research and gender disparities in medical treatment. There is, 
however, a relatively recent Supreme Court case referred to and 
relied on by women's advocates and federal regulators alike to 
support the ethical, legal, and policy justifications for removing 
the barriers to women's participation in clinical research and 
recognizing the historical treatment of women for what it has 
been-gender discrimination. 
A Johnson Controls: Laying the Ethical and Public Policy 
Foundation 
The Supreme Court, in UAW u. Johnson Controls,210 rea-
soned that decisions regarding future children are to be made 
by those who conceive and bear the children, not by employers 
or the courts.271 Johnson Controls involved a fetal protection 
policy in which the company barred all fertile women from jobs 
involving lead exposure exceeding the standard set by the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration for workers planning 
to have children.272 Petitioners claimed that the policy violated 
Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
(PDA).27a 
The Court found that the Johnson Controls policy created a 
facially discriminatory classification based on gender.274 In es-
sence, the policy "'[did] not pass the simple test of whether the 
evidence shows "treatment of a person in a manner which but 
for that person's sex would be different:"' "275 Because the pol-
269. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (protecting a woman's 
right to obtain an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (pro-
tecting a married woman's right to contraceptive choice). 
270. 499 u.s. 187 (1991). 
271. See id. at 211. Refer to text accompanying note 315 infra. 
272. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 191-92. 
273. See id. at 192. Refer to note 350 infra and accompanying text for the lan-
guage of the PDA. 
274. 499 U.S. at 197. 
275. Id. at 200 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 711 (1978), quoting Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination 
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1109, 1170 (1971)). 
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icy involved disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimi-
nation, the Court required Johnson Controls to establish that 
sex was a "'bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reason-
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness or enterprise.' "276 
Although Johnson Controls alleged strong safety concerns, 
the Court pointed out the narrow circumstances under which 
the safety exception applied.277 Consequently, the company 
could not justify its policy on grounds that it was designed to 
protect pregnant women.278 Additionally, the Court favored the 
mother's dominion over her unborn or potential offspring rather 
than a fetal protection policy enforced by an employer.279 
Turning toward legislative intent, the Court stated that 
"Congress made clear that the decision to become pregnant or 
to work while being either pregnant or capable of becoming 
pregnant was reserved for each individual woman to make for 
herself."280 Thus, Johnson Controls could not use fetal protec-
tion as a justification for its discriminatory policy. 
The Court's holding in Johnson Controls relies on three 
conclusions. First, men rarely are excluded from activities based 
on concerns for their reproductive health. Whereas men are 
often given the choice of risking their reproductive futures, 
women are not granted these choices; therefore, this is in and 
of itself discrimination.281 Second, the PDA prohibits discrimi-
nation based on pregnancy status. The Court noted that "'dis-
crimination based on . . . pregnancy is, on its face, discrimina-
tion because of . . . sex.' "282 Third, the lack of a "malevolent 
motive" and claims of beneficence do not overcome a presump-
tion that a gender-based distinction is sex discrimination.~ 
The Court's reasoning sets the policy groundwork for ad-
dressing gender disparities in clinical research. While the John-
son Controls Court framed its discussion in the context of dis-
crimination in the workplace, the decision nevertheless supports 
the policy position that excluding women from clinical trials by 
virtue of their reproductive health is discrimination against 
276. Id. at 203 (citation omitted). 
277. See id. at 202. The safety exception to the BFOQ defense generally applies 
where gender creates a risk to others and sex or pregnancy actually interferes v.ith 
the employee's ability to perform the job. See id. at 204. 
278. See id. at 206. 
279. See id. at 206-07. 
280. Id. at 206. 
281. See id. at 197. 
282. Id. at 199 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 
462 u.s. 669, 684 (1983)). 
283. See id. 
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women as women. The Court also undercut rationales of 
nonmalevolence and beneficence as the basis for excluding wom-
en from the same opportunities as men.284 Although the early 
rationale for excluding women from clinical trials was based 
historically on ethical concerns designed to protect fetuses, 
those same concerns have served to restrict women's access to 
important clinical research on women's health and to potential 
treatment alternatives. 
The Johnson Controls Court was not content to simply note 
that women should not be subjected to discrimination in gener-
al. It was very specific as to the latitude that women possess in 
making decisions about their own behaviors: women should not 
be forced to choose between pregnancy and a job,285 and the 
decision as to reproductive choice is to be left to the woman, 
not to the company.286 Thus, women are to be the sole arbi-
ters of their decisions regarding their health behaviors. 
Women should not be forced to choose between pregnancy 
and the availability of future treatment to participate in clinical 
trials. This is especially applicable to women with HIV when 
clinical trials may afford their only opportunity for access to 
treatment.287 The basis for this would be the Court's second 
provision, namely that decisions bearing on reproductive health 
status are to be exercised solely by a woman, not a company, 
and almost certainly not the government. 288 The Court went 
on to note that approximately nine percent of all fertile women 
become pregnant per year and that this rate is much less in 
certain subgroups of women.289 The Court's strong message is 
that numbers of women "vulnerable" to pregnancy, whatever 
the number, are insufficient to discriminate against women as a 
whole.290 As to whether society may extend a paternalistic ve-
to over a woman's decision, the Court further clarified its direc-
tive: "It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for 
individual employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive 
role is more important to herself and her family than her eco-
nomic role. Congress has left this choice to the woman as hers 
284. See id. 
285. See id. at 204 (emphasizing that women who are as capable as men to 
perform their jobs may not be forced to choose between having a child and having a 
job) . 
.286. See id. at 206-07. 
287. See Merton, supra note 42, at 377-78. 
288. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204, 211. 
289. !d. at 207. 
290. See id. ("[An employer's] fear of prenatal injury, no matter how sincere, 
does not begin to show that substantially all of its fertile women employees are 
incapable of doing their jobs."). 
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to mak.e."291 
In spite of this strong language, it is important to empha-
size again that Johnson Controls is a Title VII case involving 
sex discrimination in employment.292 Thus, one might argue 
that Johnson Controls may not apply directly to the exclusion 
of women from clinical research and health care benefits. Yet, 
regardless of whether the legal holding of Johnson Controls 
extends beyond the employment context, the dictum provides 
the ethical and public policy foundation for addressing gender 
discrimination in clinical research and health care. 
There is a real need for society to acknowledge that women 
are to be trusted in the decisions that they make for them-
selves and others. Women, as competent individuals, should be 
free to.incorporate their own values and preferences into medi-
cal decisions that affect their bodily integrity. This would seem 
to place women, even those who are pregnant, in the best posi-
tion to decide the advisability of entering a clinical trial. For 
women with AIDS, and for women with rare diseases, participa-
tion in a clinical trial represents a good in and of itself, in that 
access to the trial may literally be synonymous with the only 
available treatment.293 In addition, clinical trials provide good 
primary health care to women whose access to health care may 
be otherwise limited. 294 
B. Constitutional Issues 
The exclusion of women from clinical research and other 
forms of health care raises important constitutional issues. The 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution ex-
pressly prohibits states from taking any action that deprives 
any person of life or liberty or that denies any person the equal 
protection of the laws.295 Thus, some commentat.ors and 
291. Id. at 211. 
292. See id. at 192. 
293. See Merton, supra note 42, at 377-80 (arguing that clinical trials are treat-
ments for many reasons: first, new and unlicensed drugs may be obtained only by 
serving as a research subject; second, patients are introduced to new applications of 
existing therapies; third, participants can receive therapies without charge; and final-
ly, the program itself has many therapeutic aspects because of the attention and 
close monitoring the patient receives). 
294. See id. at 379. 
295. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. These provisions are "particularly rele-
vant to questions of participation in clinical research. • 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RE-
SEARCH, supra note 3, at 143; see also Megan R. Golden, Note, When Pregnancy 
Discrimination is Gender Discrimination: The Constitutionality of Excluding Pregnant 
Women from Drug Treatment Programs, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1832, 1835 (1991) (argu-
ing that refusal by drug treatment programs to treat pregnant women \iolates the 
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advocates have concluded that the "exclusion of women from 
government-sponsored or government-regulated research violates 
constitutional standards of liberty and equality."296 
1. Privacy and Liberty Interests. Decisional privacy about 
matters affecting health care is among the liberties protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 297 Where fundamental rights are 
implicated, a policy that infringes upon them is subject to 
"strict scrutiny," and courts will strike down the policy unless 
the government can show that the policy furthers a "compel-
ling'' governmental purpose that cannot be achieved by a less 
restrictive means.298 The policy also must be narrowly tailored 
to meet its goal.299 To the extent that the exclusion of women 
of childbearing potential from clinical research and other forms 
of health care burdens a fundamental right, these policies are 
subject to the strict scrutiny test. If inclusion in clinical trials 
is not seen as a fundamental right, a lower standard of review 
would be applicable. 
Much of the analysis regarding a woman's right to privacy 
and self-determination has evolved in the context of a woman's 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
296. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 143. Although private 
actors are not subject to constitutional governance, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 
1, 13 (1948) ("[A]ction inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States."), the argument can 
be made that private firms, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, act in response 
to government regulation and have such close ties to the governmental agency that 
regulates them to classify their conduct as "government action" and subject to the 
principles of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 
419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974) (finding that a "heavily regulated utility with at least 
something of a governmentally protected monopoly" may possess sufficient nexus 
with the state to render the private utility a state actor); see also Dilan A. Esper, 
Some Thoughts on the Puzzle of State Action, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 663, 683-85 (1995) 
(observing that, in certain contexts, the Supreme Court has found state action where 
government involvement appeared to be limited to regulation but has declined to do 
so in other contexts and hypothesizing that the Court predicates its nexus analysis 
to a large extent on the rights at issue rather than the level of government involve-
ment in a particular case). 
297. For example, the Court has recognized a competent individual's liberty 
interest with respect to the termination of artificial nutrition and hydration, see 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990), reproductive 
rights with respect to contraceptive choice, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 486 (1965), and a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy, see Roe v. Wade, 
410 u.s. 113, 154 (1973). 
298. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-7, at 1454 
(2d ed. 1988). 
299. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the consti-
tution .... "). 
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right to abortion. In Roe v. Wade,300 the Supreme Court ap-
plied a strict scrutiny standard to strike down a state law that 
infringed upon a woman's fundamental right to terminate her 
pregnancy.301 The issue as to whether the woman or the state 
retains a fundamental interest in medical decisionmaking has 
been further refined by the Court over the last two decades. In 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,302 the Supreme Court's most re-
cent abortion ruling, the Court reaffirmed the core of Roe when 
it noted: 
It must be stated at the outset and with clarity that 
Roe's essential holding, the holding we reaffirm, has three 
parts. First is a recognition of the right of the woman to 
choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it 
without undue interference from the State. Before viability, 
the State's interests are not strong enough to support a prohi-
bition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to 
the woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a 
confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after 
fetal viability, if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies 
which endanger a women's life or health. And third is the 
principle that the State has legitimate interests from the out-
set of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman 
and the life of the fetus that may become a child. These prin-
ciples do not contradict one another; and we adhere to 
each.303 
Casey has several implications for federal research regula-
tions. The state has a legitimate interest in regulating clinical 
trials as a form of medical intervention, to protect the health of 
. the woman and life of the fetus, much like it has the legitimate 
interest in regulating abortion as a medical procedure. Howev-
er, while Roe established a woman's fundamental right to ob-
tain an abortion, no fundamental right to health care in gener-
al, or to participate in clinical trials, in particular, has been es-
tablished.304 Nevertheless, federal regulations that erect barri-
ers to participation· in clinical trials may infringe upon liberty 
interests, in effect placing concern for fetal well-being above the 
well-being of the mother. Such liberty interests can be found in 
two areas. 
300. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
301. See id. at 164-65. 
302. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
303. Id. at 846. 
304. See Charo, supra note 261, at 152 (contending that a liberty interest should 
be inlplicated when women are denied potentially life-saving interventions, even 
though a constitutional right to health care does not exist). 
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The first group of liberty interests is grounded in personal 
autonomy and bodily integrity related to an individual's liberty 
interest in medical decisionmaking. The Court in Casey stated 
that "[j]ust as the Due Process Clause protects the deeply per-
sonal decision of the individual to refuse medical treatment, it 
also must protect the deeply personal decision to obtain medical 
treatment."305 Because participation in a clinical trial may be 
tantamount to obtaining the only life-saving or life-prolonging 
treatment currently available to a terminally ill person, the 
ability to choose this course of treatment is an issue of personal 
autonomy in medical decisionmaking. 
The second group of protected interests are those related to 
"personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education."306 
These interests are implicated, for example, when a woman 
makes an informed choice to ingest a drug needed for health 
reasons that may or may not have teratogenic effects on future 
offspring. 
Furthermore, the human subjects regulations requiring 
paternal consent for a pregnant woman to participate in a clini-
cal trial significantly burden a woman's liberty interests and 
would not withstand constitutional challenge.307 Although the 
government has the right to regulate the conduct of clinical tri-
als to protect all research subjects and ultimately the public at 
large, Subpart B creates a paternal veto that appears to con-
tradict Roe and its progeny. In Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth,308 the State attempted to argue that the decision to 
seek an abortion represented a change in family status and 
that both partners had interests in decisions affecting reproduc-
tion. 309 The Court countered that the state could not grant 
305. Casey, 505 U.S. at 927 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, dissenting in part) (relying on Cruzan v. Director, Missouri 
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). 
306. Id. at 851. 
307. Requiring a reputed father's consent, pursuant to 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207(b) & 
46.208(b), is tantamount to veto power, not only over health matters involving a 
fetus, but, as a practical matter, over the mother seeking participation in a clinical 
trial (and accompanying treatment) for herself. Although the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Casey that fathers do possess interests in their children that may be equiv-
alent to a mother's interests, the Court distinguished children from fetuses and 
found that because decisions involving the latter affect the bodily integrity of the 
mothers carrying them, the liberty interests of pregnant women retain priority in 
these decisions. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895-96. For a discussion of Subpart B and 45 
C.F.R. §§ 46.207, 46.208, refer to notes 181-97 supra and accompanying text. 
308. 428 u.s. 52 (1976). 
309. See id. at 68. 
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power to an individual that the state itself did not have.310 In 
other words, because the state cannot regulate abortion in the 
first trimester, that state lacks the constitutional power to 
grant to another-in this case, a reputed father-the power to 
veto a woman's decision to seek an abortion.311 
The Danforth court rooted its decision in a basic privacy 
argument first enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut,312 in 
which the Court held that a married individual's right to en-
gage in reproductive decisionmaking and contraceptive use is 
protected.313 The right to privacy was developed further in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird:314 "If the right of privacy means anything, 
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to 
bear or beget a child."315 
Since Roe v. Wade, the Court has ruled consistently that 
decisions regarding reproduction remain exclusively with the 
woman in the first trimester. Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has explicitly recognized that the woman as an individual adult 
has full decisionmaking power over both her reproductive status 
and decisions independent of any paternal interest. In Danforth, 
the Court determined that the individual whose choice should 
prevail is the woman's, as the one "who is the more directly and 
immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two."316 
Finally, the Court admitted that granting to a father virtual 
"veto power" over a mother's reproductive decisionmaking 
contravenes the state's intended goal of preserving the relation-
ship between the two individuals.317 
This principle was reinforced in Casey when the Court 
affirmed the Danforth principle that there is no state aim to be 
met by giving one spouse veto power over the reproductive 
decisionmaking of another.318 The weight of the decision should 
reside with the individual bearing the greatest burden of the 
decision, namely the woman herself.319 The Court questioned 
310. See id. at 69. 
311. See id. 
312. 381 u.s. 479 {1965). 
313. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 n.lO {1976) {citing 
Griswold and emphasizing the time honored notion of the right to privacy in mar-
riage). 
314. 405 u.s. 438 {1972). 
315. Id. at 453. 
316. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71. 
317. Id. 
318. See Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 {1992). 
319. See id. at 897. 
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whether a woman should be required to notify her partner and 
obtain his consent if she engages in behaviors regarding contra-
ception or other activities such as surgery that may "potentially'' 
affect her reproductive ability.320 In recognizing the dangers of 
allowing spousal notification, the Court further warned: "Perhaps 
next in line would be a statute requiring pregnant married 
women to notify their husbands before engaging in conduct 
causing risks to the fetus. "321 
The Court, in commenting so directly on this issue, suggests 
how it might rule. Such a requirement would constitute an 
invasion of privacy and a violation of decisionmaking rights 
regarding behavior affecting reproduction, and, therefore, would 
be unconstitutional. The Court concluded that the Constitution 
"protects all individuals, male and female, married or unmarried, 
from the abuse of governmental power, even where that power is 
employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the individual's 
family. "322 
The Casey Court was not content to consider only the 
ramifications of spousal notification in principle, but engaged in 
rather extensive dicta describing spousal abuse that the Court 
speculated might result from the requirement of partner 
notification. The Court presented evidence that women of all 
social and economic levels are subject to abuse, citing statistics 
that pregnancy itself may incite a partner to violence that could 
be directed not only against the woman herself, but against other 
family members including children.323 
Spousal notification also has repercussions for maintaining 
a woman's confidentiality regarding her pregnancy and preserving 
the overall well-being of the woman and her family. A require-
ment of spousal notification would mean that a woman's private 
reproductive decision could be revealed by a subpoena of her 
medical records; in addition, should a woman need to move her 
family to a shelter to protect them from an abusive partner, 
requiring spousal notification may reveal her location, resulting 
in further abuse to herself and her children. 324 
These latter points are especially relevant to pregnant 
women who wish to participate in clinical trials, particularly 
those women with HIV. As noted earlier, Subpart B requires 
320. See id. at 898. 
321. Id. 
322. ld. 
323. Id. at 892-93. Spousal abuse may not be limited to physical violence, but also 
may include psychological abuse and the restriction or elimination of economic 
resources to the family by the offending partner. ld. at 893. 
324. See id. at 888-90. 
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that, absent certain exceptions, researchers may not only notify, 
but are required to obtain consent from the reputed father.325 
Requiring a woman with HIV to notify her partner that she 
wishes to be included in a clinical trial for experimental HIV 
treatment for either her or the fetus (and to seek his consent) 
would be tantamount to a disclosure of her HIV status to that 
partner. The possibilities of physical or emotional abuse, or even 
separation from the partner, are realities for many women 
following disclosure of HIV status.328 The fear of domestic 
violence may preclude women with HIV, many of whom are poor 
with few economic opportunities or alternatives, from participat-
ing in a clinical trial that offers hope for their illness.327 
Thus, requiring paternal consent invites exactly the type of 
potential abuse of the woman or her family described in Casey. 
Not only may the woman risk harm in an existing abusive 
situation by informing her partner that she is pregnant, but even 
more violence against the woman or her family may be induced 
by informing the partner of the woman's HIV status. Women are 
harmed in one of two ways by this requirement. Either they are 
excluded from a chance for treatment for themselves or they risk 
abandonment and violence from a partner who has been informed 
of the woman's HIV status. 
2. Equal Protection. The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment restricts the right of the government to 
treat similarly situated persons differently.32s Although there is 
325. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207(b), 46.208(b). 
326. See Karen H. Rothenberg et al., Domestic Violence and Partner Notification: 
Implications for Treatment and Counseling of Women with HN, 50 JM.fWA 87, 91 
(1995) (revealing that in a study of health care providers, fears of violence, abuse, and 
abandonment were among the most important for pregnant women with mv in 
resisting spousal notification); Karen H. Rothenberg & Stephen J. Paskey, The Risk 
of Domestic Vwlence and Women with HIV Infection: Implications for Partner Notifica· 
tion, Public Policy, and the Law, 85 Al-L J. PUB. HEALTH 1569, 1571 (1995) ("The 
data ... suggest that some lnV-infected women may resist notification because they 
fear domestic violence, emotional abuse, or abandonment."). 
327. In the ACTG 076 clinical trial, refer to note 193 supra, researchers reported 
that the requirement to obtain paternal consent did, in fact, prevent some women from 
participation. Women who otherwise might have been eligible for inclusion in the study 
were fearful that if paternal consent was sought they might risk domestic violence or 
abandonment following notification to the partner that she was mv positive. Other 
women believed that the potential father had not expressed any interest in the 
pregnancy and had no right to decide whether she should participate in the clinical 
study. Telephone interviews with researchers at Johns Hopkins University and the 
University of ~land, 1994-95; see also Edward 1\L Connor et al., Reduction of 
Maternal-Infant Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I with 
Zidouudine Treatment, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1173 (1994) (describing the ACTG 
076 trial and its results). 
328. U.S. CONST. amend XIX. As with substantive due proce..~ analysis, state 
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no constitutional right to health care, it is a benefit whose 
distribution among similarly situated persons is constitutionally 
governed. The exclusion of women of childbearing potential from 
clinical research and other forms of health care is ''prima facie 
disparate treatment of two classes of persons: [potentially] fertile 
females and all others. "329 These exclusionary practices, then, 
are subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of equal 
protection analysis, women occupy an intermediate sta-
tus-historically disadvantaged, but not as disadvantaged as 
those "protected" classes that have been discriminated against 
because of race or illegitimacy. Policies and practices that have 
the purpose or effect of discriminating against women are thus 
subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny; to withstand 
constitutional challenge on equal protection grounds, "clas-
sifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and be substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives."330 As the Supreme Court later articulated, the 
government must have an "'exceedingly persuasive justification"' 
for its disparate treatment of men and women. 331 
The "important government objective" is the protection of the 
mother and her fetus from injury.332 In the case of the FDA, 
exclusionary policies also are meant to promote consumer 
protection through the safety and efficacy of drugs approved for 
marketing.333 The question, then, is whether the exclusion of all 
women, or a particular subset of women, from clinical research 
and certain other forms of health care is substantially related to 
action is required. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) ("(A]ction inhibited 
by . . . the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be 
that of the states."). The NIH and FDA are state actors governed by the Constitution, 
and their policies and regulations are subject to equal protection review. See Merton, 
supra note 42, at 423-24 (maintaining that research supported by the NIH should 
adhere to constitutional standards). In addition, the conduct of a private research or 
health care organization may be considered state action by virtue of any close 
regulation by and funding from federal, state, and local government. See, e.g., Golden, 
supra note 295, at 1866. 
329. Charo, supra note 261, at 149. 
330. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
331. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (citations 
omitted). 
332. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 148 (predicting that 
the government would argue that protecting potential life is an important government 
objective). 
333. See Ronald Podraza, The FDA's Response to AIDS: Paradigm Shift in New 
Drug Policy?, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 356-57 (1993) ("The new drug approval 
statutes and regulations have a dual purpose: (1) consumer protection, and (2) 
enforcement of recognized scientific criteria in the conduct of studies performed for the 
purpose of proving a drug's safety and effectiveness."). 
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the government objectives of protection for women and their 
fetuses and the marketing of safe, efficient drugs. 
In the context of research, the FDA's 1977 Guidelines that 
authorized the exclusion of women from early, if not all, phases 
of drug trials could not meet the "substantially related" prong of 
the test for constitutionality.334 Moreover, by authorizing the 
exclusion of all women of childbearing potential from clinical 
trials, the FDA, in effect, approved drugs for marketing to women 
without any testing at all of the potential danger to women or 
their fetuses. This is clearly in direct contradiction with and not 
substantially related to the government's intention to protect 
these populations.335 Fetal protection regulations that overlook 
the role of male factors in causing fetal defects also do not 
guarantee overall fetal well-being; there is evidence now that 
birth defects may be transmitted via damaged sperm.336 In fact, 
the "overinclusiveness" of Subpart B is also subject to equal 
protection challenges because it singles out pregnant women for 
exclusion from clinical research.337 
It has been argued, however, that discrimination based on 
reproductive status is not gender discrimination per se. Rather, 
the two classes of individuals distinguished for unequal treatment 
are women who are capable of becoming pregnant and persons 
who are not capable of becoming pregnant, a class that would 
include some women as well as all men.338 This reasoning is 
subject to question. A policy that distinguishes between these 
groups is, on its face, gender neutral. To be upheld, such a policy 
need only be rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest unless it is found to be intentionally discriminatory. In 
334. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 147 (arguing that the 
exclusion of women of childbearing potential would violate the Equal Protection 
Clause). Other discriminatory practices, such as the exclusion of all pregnant women 
from substance abuse treatment programs, would require individualized determinations 
of the sufficiency of the government actor's rationale for the practice. See Golden, 
supra note 295, at 1869 ("The drug treatment programs' policies [that exclude pregnant 
women] thus should be treated as a gender classification, subject to heightened judicial 
scrutiny. A13 such, they should be held to violate the equal protection clause unless 
they are substantially related to an important government interest. .. ). 
335. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 147. A great number 
of drugs that are prescribed to women are tested only on women in the marketplace 
when prescribed. See Merton, supra note 42, at 380-81 (describing women as ~guinea 
pigs" when a new treatment hits the market). For drugs that are prescribed to 
pregnant women, the lack of dosage studies prevents establishing minimal dosing 
levels that would serve to limit harm to both women and fetuses. See id. at 385-86. 
336. See Merton, supra note 42, at 392 n.107, 396 (discussing the failure of 
policies to address male-medicated reproductive outcomes). 
337. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 147. 
338. See id. at 148 (analyzing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)). 
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Geduldig v. Aiello,339 the Supreme Court upheld a state's deci-
sion to exclude disabilities resulting from pregnancy from 
coverage under the state's disability insurance program.340 
Reasoning that all classifications involving pregnancy do not 
necessarily amount to classification based on gender for the 
purpose of equal protection analysis,341 the Court applied the 
rational basis standard of review and concluded that the state's 
disability coverage policy was rationally related to several 
legitimate interests.342 
Geduldig can be distinguished from the proposition that 
excluding women of childbearing potential from clinical research 
is not gender discrimination. The underlying basis of the 
Geduldig holding was the fact that the benefits that were 
available under the disability insurance program were available 
equally to men and women.343 Pregnant women received the 
same coverage as nonpregnant persons.344 In the context of clin-
ical research, women of childbearing potential are not provided 
the same benefits, including the opportunity to participate in 
clinical trials and receive the provided therapies, as persons who 
are not capable of becoming pregnant. 
Equal protection may also apply to ''benign classifications," 
which favor one group over another, in order to remedy past 
discrimination.345 Arguably, then, the NIH Revitalization Act, 
which requires the affirmative inclusion of women in clinical 
studies, would constitute a benign classification. 346 If a man 
challenged the constitutionality of this statute on grounds of 
disparate treatment, the intermediate scrutiny test for application 
to exclusion also would be applicable.347 The success of such a 
challenge might depend on whether the government could present 
339. 417 u.s. 484 (1974). 
340. See id. at 497. 
341. See id. at 496 n.20 ("While it is true that only women can become pregnant 
it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-
based classification . . . . "). 
342. See id. at 496. The Court recognized the state's interest in maintaining the 
self-supporting nature of its insurance program (it would have been very costly to 
include pregnancy-related disability in its insurance scheme), distributing available re-
sources so as to keep benefit payments at adequate levels for those disabilities that 
were covered, and maintaining a contribution rate not unduly burdensome to 
participating employees. See id. at 495-96. For a creative analysis of Geduldig, see 
Golden supra note 292, at 1856-66 (arguing that Geduldig is consistent with 
intermediate scrutiny). 
343. See Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97. 
344. Id. 
345. 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 149-50. 
346. See id. at 150. 
347. See id. at 147. 
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evidence of past discrimination against women in clinical 
research to justify the disparate treatment.348 
C. Federal and State Antidiscrimination Statutes 
Statutory protection against gender discrimination in 
employment is set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.349 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which was made part 
of Title VII, protects employed women who are pregnant.:l!o 
Title VII protects against disparate treatment of men and women 
and against practices that create disparate impacts on different 
classifications of people.351 
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court, in Johnson Controls, 
held that a fetal protection policy that prevented fertile women 
from certain employment opportunities violated Title VII and the 
PDA 352 First, the Court found the policy was gender-specific 
because it applied only to the potential offspring of the female 
employees "[d]espite evidence in the record about the debilitating 
effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system."3!i3 This 
practice of the differential application of privileges to men and 
women constituted gender discrimination.3!>1 The Court also rea-
soned that despite potential risks to offspring, Title VII provided 
that "[ w ]omen who are pregnant or potentially pregnant must be 
348. See id. at 150. 
349. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (1988). 
350. Although Title vn explicitly prohibits sex discrimination, it did not originally 
mention pregnancy discrimination, allowing the Supreme Court in General Electric Co. 
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) to hold that certain pregnancy classifications did not 
constitute gender discrimination. See id. at 139-40. In response, Congress passed the 
PDA "to change the definition of sex discrimination in Title VII to reflect the 
commonsense view" that pregnancy discrimination is gender discrimination. HOUSE 
COMM:. ON EDUC. & LABOR, PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION BASED ON 
PREGNANCY, H.R. REP. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978). The PDA pro\ides, 
in relevant part: 
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but nre not 
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related 
purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988). 
351. See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 136-37 (describing that "a prima facie violation of 
Title vn can be established in some circumstances upon proof that the effect of an 
otherwise facially neutral plan or classification is to discriminate against members of 
one class or another"). 
352. See UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991). Refer to subpart 
IV(A) supra. 
353. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 198. 
354. See id. at 197. 
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treated like others. "355 
Because Title VII only applies in the employment context, its 
legal application to clinical research and other health care may 
be limited.356 At least when a study uses paid participants, the 
subjects' participation may be considered "employment," and 
exclusionary practices in this context may be subject to Title VII 
scrutiny. 357 In any case, the ethical and policy foundation 
established by Johnson Controls is quite significant.358 
Gender discrimination in research also may be prohibited by 
Title IX, which states that "[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance."359 One commentator has argued that Title IX might 
provide the basis for a sex discrimination claim by women ex-
cluded from clinical research conducted at educational institutions 
receiving federal funds. 360 
Recently, claims under federal antidiscrimination statutes, 
including Title VII, are being raised in courts by women seeking 
access to high-dose chemotherapy (HDCT) and autologous bone 
marrow transplant (ABMT) for breast cancer.361 It is alleged 
that employers and group health insurers with whom they 
contract discriminate by paying for HDCT/ABMT for some 
cancers, but not for breast cancer.362 On June 16, 1995, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that an employer and its 
355. !d. at 204. 
356. See, e.g., Mary A. Bobinski, Women and HIV: A Gender-Based Analysis of a 
Disease and Its Legal Regulation, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 7, 21-22 (1994) (considering 
a claim in the context of women with HIV attempting to obtain access to research 
trials). Refer to subpart IV(A) supra for a discussion of Johnson Controls, a Title VII 
case. 
357. See Merton, supra note 42, at 423 (suggesting that in "the rare circumstancen 
where the subjects are paid, the participation could be considered a form of employ-
ment). 
358. Refer to subpart IV(A) supra. 
359. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994). 
360. See Bobinski, supra note 356, at 22 n.55. "Potential research participants 
excluded by reason of their gender might be entitled to relief under this provision, but 
would have to establish that they are 'persons' protected from discrimination under the 
Act and that their exclusion from research trials constituted 'discrimination.' n !d. 
361. See Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(raising claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act for denial of health coverage 
for HDCT); Reger v. Espy, 836 F. Supp. 869, 870 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (charging that 
denial of coverage for HDCT/ABMT for breast cancer violates the Federal Employees 
Health Benefits Act). In addition, these claims charge violations of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993), and of various state 
antidiscrimination laws that might prohibit sex discrimination or discrimination based 
on disability. See Henderson, 70 F.3d at 959. 
362. Henderson, 70 F.3d at 959; Reger, 836 F. Supp. at 871-72. 
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health insurer could be required to pay for such treatments, even 
though such coverage was excluded specifically under the terms 
of the insurance policy.363 Without payment assurance, the 
plaintiff was not able to enroll in a clinical trial that might have 
afforded her the best chance of survival.364 Although this case, 
and others like it, involve payment issues, they directly impact 
women's access to research and treatment.355 
Gender discrimination is not addressed in other federal laws 
barring discrimination by recipients of federal funds, in public 
facilities, or by places of public accommodation.:JSS However, 
gender discrimination is regulated by state statutes prohibiting 
discrimination in places of "public accommodation. "367 Public 
accommodations might include facilities such as clinics, hospitals, 
private doctors, and dentists. These laws potentially provide a 
cause of action for women seeking access to clinical research and 
treatment, with at least one court showing a willingness to 
examine state antidiscrimination laws within the conteA"t of 
women's health care services. 
In Elaine W. v. Joint Diseases Northern General Hospital, 
Inc.,368 pregnant women as a class were denied enrollment in 
a hospital substance abuse program.369 The hospital defended 
its policy based on the medical grounds that it lacked the 
services of an obstetrician, and it was therefore not licensed to 
363. See Henderson, 70 F.3d at 962. Currently, at least six states either have 
passed or are considering legislation mandating that insurers offer coverage for 
HDCT/ABMT treatment of delineated cancers, including breast cancer. See GA. CODE 
.ANN. § 33-29-3.3 (Supp. 1995) (ABMT); :MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 47M (West 
Supp. 1995) (ABMT); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 376.782, 376.1200 (Vernon Supp. 1996); N.H. 
REv. STAT . .ANN. § 415:18-c (Supp. 1994) (ABZ..1T); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2·3418.1:1 
(Michie 1994) <HDCT and ABMT); Health Insurance-Breast Cancer Treatment. H.F. 
No. 1742, 1995 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (to be codified at MINN. STAT. § 62A.307). 
Pursuant to the United States Office of Personnel Management and Policy (OPM}, all 
health insurance plans provided to federal employees must offer such treatment for 
breast cancer, as well as a number of other cancers, as a mandated benefit. Telephone 
interview with OPM staff, July 1995. 
364. See Henderson, 70 F.3d at 960. 
365. It is unclear to what extent the provision of employee health benefits in this 
context would fall within the reach of Title Vll. Furthermore, short of CA'Plicitly 
excluding procedures for all women, it might be difficult to demonstrate disparate 
impact. 
366. See Bobinski, supra note 356, at 22 n.55. 
367. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney 1993) ("It shall be an 
unlawful discriminatory practice for any ... owner ... or employee of any place of 
public accommodation, ... to [refuse, withhold from, or deny] any of the accommoda· 
tions, advantages, facilities and privileges of any such place . . . to any person on 
account of ... sex .... "). 
368. 613 N.E.2d 523 (N.Y. 1993). 
369. See id. at 524. 
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provide obstetrical care to the women.370 The New York Court 
of Appeals ruled that the hospital's use of a medical explanation 
to exclude a class did not justify discrimination if the discrimina-
tory behavior was based in fact on generalities surrounding the 
medical condition.371 The court declared that any wholesale 
exclusion of pregnant women must be medically warranted.372 
The facility had the burden to show that absolutely no pregnant 
woman could be treated regardless of her health, stage of 
pregnancy, or the severity of her addiction.373 Alternatively, the 
facility would have to demonstrate that it could not identify ''with 
reasonable medical certainty" those women who would require 
"immediate on-site obstetrical services" during their treatment for 
substance abuse.374 
The New York court observed that "[m]any discriminatory 
practices develop improperly because of a paternalistic sense of 
what is 'best' for those who are discriminated against. "375 The 
burden lies with medical facilities to show a medical basis for the 
discriminatory practice.376 A demonstration that some, or even 
most, of the recipients should be denied access on medical 
grounds is insufficient to deny the entire class of pregnant 
women.377 Therefore, distinctions based solely on a pregnant 
condition constitute sex discrimination.378 Consequently, state 
antidiscrimination laws may potentially provide a basis for 
protecting women's access to research and treatment in places of 
public accommodation. 379 
370. See id. 
371. See id. at 524-25 (holding that distinctions based solely upon a woman's 
pregnant condition constitutes sexual discrimination). 
372. See id. at 524. 
373. See id. at 525. 
37 4. !d. at 525, 526. 
375. Id. at 525-26. 
376. See id. at 525. 
377. See id. at 526. 
378. See id. (stating that "'[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an 
insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not 
apply'" (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart 435 U.S. 702, 708 · 
(1978) (alteration in original)). 
379. One commentator suggests a contrary view: 
[The Elaine W.] holding, while technically favorable for plaintiffs seeking to 
challenge the exclusion of women from drug treatment centers, is nevertheless 
quite limited. It provides no support for the argument that hospitals which 
purport to provide drug treatment programs should make available the full 
range of medical services that might be needed by program participants, 
including obstetrical services. 
Bobinski, supra note 356, at 23. 
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D. Tort Liability 
Medical researchers and pharmaceutical manufacturers share 
a fear that if a woman participating in research becomes 
pregnant and her fetus is harmed, they will be held liable.38i) 
This fear is often the reason for the exclusion of women from 
clinical trials, despite a very low reported incidence of research 
injuries381 and few reported legal cases concerning such inju-
ries.382 Fear of liability, however, has not operated to exclude 
men from participating in clinical trials, despite evidence that 
some fetal injury may be attributed to the father's e::-..-posure to 
toxic substances.383 Ironically, fear of liability has never operat-
ed as a rationale for the inclusion of women in clinical research, 
even though there may be more legal precedent for liability due 
to exclusion.384 
1. Liability for Inclusion. 
mt is impossible to quantify the risk of tort liability from the 
inclusion of women in clinical studies at this time, because: (1) 
there is no complete compendium of unreported cases involving 
settlements and (2) pregnant women and women of childbearing 
age have not been included in some major studies in the 
past.385 
Potential liability for injuries to women (and men) who 
participate in clinical research is unlikely, provided that informed 
380. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 150. 
381. See id. at 151. Nlli and the FDA do not require researchers or sponsors to 
report research injuries. While no central registry of publicly or privately funded 
research injuries exists, a 1975 survey of principal investigators indicates the incidence 
of injury to be about 3.7%. ld. Less than 1~ of research participants suffered perma-
nently disabling or fatal injuries. Id. The incidence of injury in this survey wns not 
separated by gender or age. ld. 
382. See id. Nlli has been involved in three legal actions in the last 20 years. See 
id. One case brought against Nlli directly was dismissed, and the other two were tried 
against Nlli grantee institutions. See id. at 170 n.5. Furthermore, the FDA has never 
been sued for a clinical trial injury, and private firms have been involved only in 
approximately two dozen reported cases. See id. at 151. 
It is possible that legal recourse for research injuries is not sought in many 
cases because of the fact that prior to enrollment in a clinical trial, the potential 
participant is given a detailed description of the risks and benefits of the proposed 
therapy, as well as their likelihood. See id. at 152. While enrolled in the trial, 
participants receive not only the test therapy, but also a fairly high level of medical 
care. See id. Participants may therefore feel that they have assumed the risks of 
participating in the clinical trial and have no right to pursue a claim for injuries. See 
id. 
383. See id. at 150. 
384. See id. 
385. Id. at 12-13. 
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consent to participate in the research is obtained in accordance 
with federal regulations and state tort law.386 Federal regula-
tions on disclosure may help to establish the standard of care in 
a particular situation.387 Even if a woman who has been injured 
as a result of her participation in a clinical trial could prove the 
necessary elements for recovery under a negligence theory, 
researchers and manufacturers nonetheless may have defended 
themselves from liability for her injuries by securing her 
informed consent prior to participation in the trial. 388 
Liability, then, turns on the "informed" nature of the 
woman's consent to participate in the research-whether she has 
been adequately warned of the potential risks of the research.389 
If the researcher has met the requisite standard of care by 
warning the woman of the potential risks of the trial in which 
she wishes to participate, and if she chooses to participate, it is 
unlikely that she will succeed in any subsequent negligence 
action for injuries that may occur as a result of her participation 
in the trial. 
Under strict liability principles, however, a defendant will be 
held liable for injuries resulting from his or her unreasonably 
dangerous activity. 390 In the context of clinical research, liability 
may be found regardless of the woman's informed consent to 
participate. 391 Providing adequate warning of the risks of the 
386. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116-.117 (delineating general requirements and documents 
for informed consent). In the context of research, a battery action may be brought if 
the participant is subjected to a study without her knowledge or consent. See 1 
WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 153. If the initial consent to 
participate did not include adequate disclosure of risks and alternatives, the legal 
action will be based on negligence for lack of informed consent. See id. at 13, 153-54. 
387. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH at 154, 156. In some states, the 
standard of reasonable disclosure is defined as the customary practice of physicians; 
other states use the prudent person standard where inquiry is made into what a 
prudent person in these circumstances would want to know. See id. at 156. 
388. See id. at 152, 155. 
389. Federal regulations, as well as FDA guidelines, require researchers and IRBs 
to obtain the informed consent of all persons who participate in clinical research. See 
id. at 158-59. The standard for what constitutes informed consent varies from state 
to state, but in general, three standards exist in the context of medical malpractice. 
Some states allow a physician to disclose a level of information regarding risks and 
benefits that is customary for physicians practicing in the community. See id. at 156. 
Some states require physicians to disclose all information that a "prudent person" in 
the patient's position would want to know. See id. In a few other states, a more 
subjective standard has been adopted, requiring physicians to disclose all information 
needed to allow the particular patient to make an informed decision. See id. at 156-57. 
Recently, a federal court held that a higher standard for informed consent-a duty to 
inform a potential participant of all "reasonably foreseeable" risks-is required for 
participation in nontherapeutic research injury cases. See Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 
F. Supp. 1463, 1472 (M.D.N.C. 1986), a{fd, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987). 
390. See 1 WOJ\IEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 154. 
391. See id. 
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experimental therapy or drug, however, may insulate the 
researcher or manufacturer from liability.392 Moreover, it is pos-
sible that strict liability principles do not apply to drug trials.3-<;J 
Case law suggests that manufacturers of experimental drugs, as 
well as providers of experimental medical services, may not be 
held strictly liable for the effects of the drugs or services if the 
participants in the clinical research have given legally sufficient 
informed consent to participate and the trial is conducted appro-
priately.394 
Questions of liability more often focus on potential harm to 
the future offspring of women who participate in clinical 
trials.395 It is unclear in this context whether obtaining the 
informed consent of the mother would be sufficient to avoid 
liability for the injury to the offspring. To date, there has been 
virtually no case law establishing parameters for holding 
researchers or drug manufacturers liable for injuries to the 
offspring of clinical trial participants;396 however, liability can 
be analyzed by looking to the purpose of the clinical trial in 
which the mother participated. 
392. See id. 
393. See id. at 154-55 (noting that strict liability applies when a product is sold 
in a defective, unreasonably unsafe condition). In a clinical trial, however, the manu-
facturer is not selling the drug to a participant. Id. Therefore, a participant who is 
injured by an experimental drug may have no recourse against a manufacturer for her 
injucy based on the theory of strict liability. See id. (citing Ellen Flannery & Sanford 
N. Greenberg, Liability Exposure for Exclusion and Inclusion of Women as Subj'ects in 
Clinical Studies, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3). This argument 
is supported by comment k to § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which pro-
tects a drug manufacturer from strict liability if a drug is "properly prepared and 
marketed, and proper warning is given.• Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A. 
comment k (1964). Comment k also applies this protection to e>.'Jlerimental drugs, in 
particular, where, "because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical 
experience, there can be no assurance of safety.• Id. 
394. See, e.g., Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 340-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) 
(holding that an experimental drug manufacturer was not strictly liable when the 
warning was adequate, possible risks were outweighed by possible benefits to society, 
and the plaintiff voluntarily participated in the dangerous activity}. It is interesting 
to note, however, that the Gaston court first rejected the notion that strict liability 
would not apply to drugs in the experimental phase because they were not sold. See 
id. at 339; see also Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 1991} 
(applying the medical services exemption to producers of blood products}. 
395. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 159. "The child, if he 
is born alive, is now permitted in every jurisdiction to maintain an action for the 
consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies of such injuries after birth an action 
will lie for his wrongful death." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted). 
396. There have been only two cases of reported research injuries to offspring. See 
1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 162. In both cases, the University 
of Chicago was found liable because it had failed to obtain consent to C.'\'Jleriment \~ith 
DES on pregnant women. See id. at 162 (analyzing Roberts v. Patel, 620 F. Supp. 323 
(N.D. Ill. 1985) and Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978}}. 
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The first, and fairly clear-cut, case would involve participa-
tion in a clinical trial where the treatment received was thera-
peutic for the fetus. In such a case, it is unlikely that liability 
would be found when informed consent to the treatment was 
provided to further the best interest of the fetus and improve its 
health.397 
Some commentators have reasoned that the result would be 
less clear if participation in the clinical trial was sought because 
the experimental treatment or drug was designed to be therapeu-
tic for the mother only.398 In such a case, liability might rest on 
an analysis of the seriousness of the mother's illness, the risks 
to the fetus, and the existence of any safer alternatives. 399 
When balancing these factors, however, the woman's health and 
autonomy interests should not be subordinated to those of the 
fetus.400 
Thus, it appears that when there is no negligence and the 
appropriate informed consent to participation in a clinical trial 
has been obtained, it is unlikely, but not impossible, that 
researchers and sponsors will be held liable in tort for the 
inclusion of women in their studies.401 Furthermore, the possi-
bility of tort liability seems "remote at best" when viewed in the 
context of the Supreme Court's rejection in Johnson Controls of 
the employer's fear of liability as a justification for its discrimina-
tory fetal protection policy. In so holding, the Court reasoned that 
397. See id. (citing Roberts and holding that a parent may consent for treatment 
on the unborn fetus). 
398. See, e.g., id. at 162-63. 
399. See id. If the intervention is a benefit to the mother (but not for a serious 
illness), or if there is a known risk to the fetus and there are safer treatment 
alternatives, the risk of liability may be higher for the drug manufacturer or trial 
sponsor. See id. at 163. There is also the rare possibility that a woman may wish to 
participate in clinical research where the experimental treatment is not therapeutic for 
her or her fetus. See id. Subpart B would virtually exclude most of this type of 
research. See id. 
400. See id. at 17 ("[P]regnant women should be treated as competent adults 
capable of making their own decisions about participation in research."); see also In 
re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1252 (D.C. 1990) (holding that in virtually all cases the 
question of what is to be done is to be decided by the patient on behalf of herself and 
the fetus). 
401. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 163-64. At least one 
commentator has argued that there may be "settings in which third parties are not 
entitled to rely on even the fully informed consent of prospective parents to immunize 
them from later liability if the protocol poses very serious risks to the unborn child 
while offering little benefit to the subject adult or to adults in general." See Ellen W. 
Clayton, Liability Exposure When Offspring Are Injured Because of Their Parents' 
Participation in Clinical Trials, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 
103, 107. On the other band, one could argue that because informed consent obtained 
from the woman acts as an intervening cause in the injury to the offspring, there is 
no legal precedent for holding a researcher liable. See Merton, supra note 42, at 407. 
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"[i]f, under general tort principles, Title vn bans sex-specific 
fetal-protection policies, the employer fully informs the woman of 
the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the basis 
for holding an employer liable seems remote at best.""'!)2 
In his concurring opinion, Justice White observed that "it is 
far from clear that compliance with Title vn will pre-empt state 
tort liability."403 In response, the majority reasoned that the law 
would not punish an employer who complied with Title VTI be-
cause "[w]hen it is impossible for an employer to comply with 
both state and federal requirements, this Court has ruled that 
federal law pre-empts that of the States.""'M It also maintained 
that the increased cost of employing women of childbearing 
potential, including the cost of liability insurance, could not 
justify an exclusionary policy that discriminates on the basis of 
gender.405 Based on this reasoning, Johnson Controls lends 
support to the argument that the federal policy encouraging, if 
not mandating, the inclusion of women in clinical research should 
not be undermined based on the fear of tort liability by research-
ers, drug manufacturers, and other third parties. Furthermore, 
even though Johnson Controls is an employment discrimination 
case, it reinforces the importance of adequate informed consent 
as a means of promoting the autonomy of women, as well as 
men, and of reducing any likelihood of tort liability for the 
inclusion of women in clinical research. 
2. Liability for Exclusion. Liability for the exclusion of 
women from clinical research may occur when a woman takes a 
drug or receives a treatment that was untested in women during 
the clinical trials. The evolution of public policy that establishes 
the importance of including women in clinical research has 
prompted commentators to suggest that researchers and drug 
manufacturers should focus their concern on liability that results 
from the exclusion of women from clinical research.4013 Unlike 
speculation about liability for inclusion, legal precedent that has 
based liability, in part, on the inadequate testing of a drug before 
it was released into the market does exist.407 It is also possible 
402. UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 197, 208 (1991). 
403. Id. at 213 (White, J., concurring). 
404. Id. at 209 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 
132, 142-43 (1963)). 
405. See id. at 210. 
406. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 13 (proposing that 
liability concerns should not impede inclusion of women in clinical studies). 
407. See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968), modified on other grounds, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); West''· Johnson & John-
son Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437 (Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 824 (1986}; 
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that a medical malpractice claim could result from the inappro-
priate application of a treatment regimen that was developed 
through research in which only men were studied. Thus, in 
contrast to liability for a research injury that results from being 
included in research, liability for exclusion may result from the 
lack of data necessary to establish appropriate standards for the 
treatment of women. 
Drug manufacturer liability may be found where physiologi-
cal differences exist between men's and women's responses to a 
particular drug, causation between the drug and the woman's 
injury can be established, and the manufacturer fails to test the 
drug on women.408 If a woman who takes the drug has an 
adverse reaction or if her future offspring is harmed, it would be 
her exclusion from research, not her inclusion, that caused the 
injury and that forms the basis for liability. Applying strict 
liability principles, a defectively designed product may serve as 
the basis for liability should an injury occur. A drug that has not 
been adequately tested on women may be found to be defectively 
designed, even if approved for marketing by the FDA.409 
The practice of "male-only" drug trials may also result in 
liability for failure to warn, especially when there is evidence of 
risk to women.410 Under a negligence theory of product liability, 
manufacturers have a duty to warn about not only known risks 
of a drug, but also foreseeable risks that should have been 
known.411 If there had been evidence that the drug might be 
unsafe for use in women (based on animal reproduction studies 
or physiological gender differences) or if the manufacturer chose 
not to perform studies that would ascertain the dangers that it 
should have known, the manufacturer's failure to ascertain and 
warn against these risks would support a product liability claim, 
despite compliance with FDA standards.412 
For health care providers, liability resulting from exclusion 
Taylor v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 362 N.W.2d 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Barson v. E.R. 
Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984). These cases are discussed in 1 WOMEN 
AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 166. 
408. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 166. 
409. See id. at 165-66 (citing Ellen Flannery & Sanford N. Greenberg, Liability 
Exposure for Inclusion of Women as Subjects in Clinical Studies, in 2 WOMEN AND 
HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 91) ("Manufacturers' liability results when, after 
a drug is on the market, evidence emerges that the drug is more dangerous or less 
effective in women."); see also Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 836 
(Utah 1984) (noting that FDA standards and guidelines for testing are minimum stan-
dards). 
410. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 167. 
411. See id. at 165. 
412. If the manufacturer deliberately failed to learn about such risks, it could also 
be liable for punitive damages. See id. 
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of women from drug trials and other clinical research may arise 
in the form of medical malpractice claims. Such cases may be 
based on the negligent prescription of drugs that were not tested 
on women413 or the inappropriate medical treatment of women's 
health conditions where there is no research data to support 
efficacy or safety in women.'114 For example, at one time, women 
had a ten-fold higher risk of dying in the hospital after undergo-
ing coronary angioplasty, a procedure in which a tiny balloon 
catheter is threaded into a blocked artery and then inflated, thus 
flattening the blockage.415 The mortality difference eventually 
was attributed to the smaller artery size of women, a factor that 
was not considered when angioplasty was developed:us Now 
that the machines have been scaled down and the inflatable 
balloons used in women are smaller and more appropriate for 
their artery size, it would be negligent for a physician to fail to 
adapt angioplasty procedures to gender differences. 
The promulgation of federal regulations and guidelines that 
promote the inclusion of women in clinical research may both 
raise the expectations of women for better health care and 
provide evidence of a standard of health care that recognizes that 
gender matters. As the standard of care develops to adapt drugs 
and treatment to gender differences based on clinical research, a 
physician's failure to adjust his or her clinical practice according-
ly might be the basis for a malpractice action. 
V. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
In September, 1992, the Office of Research on Women's 
Health (ORWH) of the National Institutes of Health, commis-
sioned the Institute of Medicine to establish a Committee on the 
Ethical and Legal Issues Relating to the Inclusion of Women in 
413. See id. 
414. See id. at 166-67. Medical malpractice may also result from misdiagnosis of 
conditions whose manifestations in women have not been adequately studied or, as a 
result of gender bias and communication barriers, have not been seriously considered. 
One clear example of this is ignoring heart attacks in women. When a 42 year old 
smoker went to a local clinic complaining of chest pains that she had experienced on 
and off for a year, she was told she probably had gallstones. See LAURENCE & 
WEINHOUSE, supra note 10, at 85. When the pain got worse, she returned to the clinic 
where, despite the fact that her father and two uncles had died of heart attacks when 
young, the original diagnosis was affirmed. See id. She went home, collapsed from 
chest pain, and nearly died from a massive heart attack. See id. 'When she was 
appropriately diagnosed at a larger teaching hospital, cardiologists wondered why no 
one in the local clinic recognized heart disease in a heavy smoker \',ith chest pain and 
a family history of death from heart attack. See id. 
415. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 104, 105. 
416. See id. at 105. 
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Clinical Studies. 417 The Committee was charged with examining 
the ethical and legal implications of policies that would broaden 
inclusion of women in clinical trials, including pregnant women 
and women of childbearing potential.418 The Committee's recom-
mendations were finalized after passage of the NIH Revitalization 
Act but prior to publication of the 1994 Nffi Guidelines. Much of 
the Committee's recommendations are still being integrated to 
varying degrees in NIH policy. Thus, it is important to highlight 
the most significant social, legal, and ethical considerations that 
formed the basis for the Committee's recommendations and that 
are critical to our moving forward in this area. These consider-
ations will be integrated into a discussion of broader policy issues 
and strategies that address gender bias in all aspects of health 
care. 
A. Justice 
The ethical principle of justice is not achieved when the 
national research agenda does not address women's health issues 
and when women are subject to treatments that have not been 
adequately tested on their gender. Toward this goal, the Women's 
Health Initiative (WHI), the largest U.S. preventive study of its 
kind, has been established to examine the major causes of and 
treatments for cardiovascular disease, cancer, and osteoporosis in 
postmenopausal women.419 Although it demonstrates NIH's 
commitment to expanding our knowledge of important women's 
health issues, the WHI is but one step in achieving justice in our 
national research agenda. 
Where there has not been a fair allocation of research, 
attention, or resources, "justice may require a policy of preferen-
tial treatment . . . in order to remedy a past injustice."420 Our 
417. See id. at vi. 
418. See id. The recommendations of the Committee are set out in WOMEN IN 
HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3. It is from participation as a member of this 
Committee that the author endorses the policy recommendations on clinical research. 
For a listing of the other members of the Committee, see id. at iii, iv. 
419. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, OVERVIEW STATEMENT ON 
WOMEN'S HEALTH INITIATIVE (1995). The WHI has three major components: "a 
randomized controlled clinical trial of promising but unproven approaches to 
prevention; an observational study to identify predictors of disease; and a study of 
community approaches to developing healthful behaviors." Id. at 1. The trial will enroll 
approximately 64,500 postmenopausal women 50-79 years of age and will require a 15 
year time frame and an investment of $628 million. See id. at 1-2. 
420. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 5. Furthermore, 
"[w]omen and men should be enrolled as participants in clinical studies in a manner 
that ensures that research yields scientifically generalizable results applicable to both 
genders." ld. 
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enthusiasm for including women and minorities in clinical studies 
should not mean, however, that these groups now get targeted for 
coercive activity. Because of the requirements of the Nlli 
Revitalization Act, researchers may feel pressured to recruit and 
retain participants aggressively from the same groups that 
historically had been subject to abuse and e:l\.-ploitation."21 
Voluntariness and informed consent must protect subjects from 
unethical and coercive treatment.422 Thus, the Committee 
recommended that, in designing recruitment and consent 
procedures, principal investigators must be sensitive to the con-
cerns and needs of those groups that have had a history of ex-
ploitation or abuse in prior human experimentation.''23 
B. Consistency in Federal Regulations: Presumption of Inclusion 
Although recent changes in relevant federal policies appear 
to promote inclusion rather than exclusion, there still remains 
confusion about the extent to which women of childbearing 
potential, and particularly pregnant women, are to be included 
or excluded in clinical research. The Nlli and FDA differ in their 
goals and definitions of clinical trials and research; thus it is 
important that, wherever possible, federal agencies establish 
consistent policies in order to avoid regulatory paralysis.''2' 
More specifically, based on an analysis of ethical principles, 
current statutory and constitutional principles, and the current 
state of liability concerns, federal policy should assure that both 
women and men of reproductive age are not excluded by 
investigators and IRBs from participating in clinical studies:'~ 
"[T]he potential or prospect of becoming pregnant during [a] 
study may not be used as a justification for precluding or 
limiting participation" of women of reproductive age.42a This 
recommendation is based on the principle of respect for persons, 
as well as a recognition that both men and women must evaluate 
risks to their reproductive system in the same manner as risks 
to other organ systems.427 Through the use of the informed 
consent process, both men and women can evaluate the risks to 
reproduction and potential offspring:'28 
421. See id. at 9-10. 
422. See id. at 10. 
423. See id. 
424. See id. at 11. 
425. See id. at 12. 
426. Id. at 15. 
427. See id. 
428. See id. The Committee further recommended thnt "the participant be 
permitted to select voluntarily the contraceptive method of his or her choice .,.;here 
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C. Special Considerations for Pregnant Women 
Because of significant gaps in knowledge with respect to the 
treatment of pregnant women, NIH must strongly encourage and 
facilitate clinical research to advance the treatment of pre-
existing medical conditions in women who become pregnant, 
medical conditions of pregnancy, and conditions that threaten 
successful course of pregnancy.429 Consequently, pregnant 
women should be presumed eligible for participation in clinical 
studies.430 Thus, the Committee advocates that "[e]ven when 
evidence concerning risks is unknown or ambiguous, the decision 
about acceptability of risk to the pregnancy or to offspring should 
be made by the woman as part of the informed consent pro-
cess."431 
It is important to note that presuming pregnant women are 
eligible is not the equivalent of advocating their active 
recruitment for each clinical study. There may be valid scientific 
and medical reasons for excluding pregnant women from a 
certain clinical study.432 After much debate and discussion, most 
Committee members ultimately endorsed the following recommen-
dations: 
Investigators and IRBs may exclude pregnant women from 
participation only when the IRB finds, and records its finding 
in writing, that the following standard has been met: (1) there 
is no prospect of medical benefit to the pregnant woman, and 
(2) a risk of significant harm to potential offspring is known or 
can be plausibly inferred.433 
Under this standard, it is expected that an IRB might "exclude 
pregnant women from the earliest phases of some drug trials, but 
[that] most clinical studies would remain open to pregnant 
women."434 
there are no relevant study-dependent scientific reasons for excluding certain contracep-
tives .... [P]regnancy termination options [should also] be discussed as part of tho 
consent process in clinical studies that pose unknown or foreseeable risks to potential 
offspring." Id. 
429. See id. at 16. 
430. See id. at 17. Furthermore, women who are lactating should not be excluded 
from clinical studies, but the informed consent process should incorporate discussion 
of any special risks to children. See id. at 15. 
431. Id. at 17. 
432. See id. The Committee cites the example of a pregnant woman being excluded 
from a contraception study on a hormone replacement study. See id. 
433. Id. at 18. A finding that trial participation may risk significant harm may 
be based on evidence from animal studies, in vitro studies, structure-activity 
relationship data, or previous clinical experience. Id. 
434. Id. It is worth noting that a few of my colleagues on the Committee believed 
that we should accommodate the conscience of individual investigators who believe that 
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The principles of respect for persons, justice, and the need for 
scientific knowledge support the presumption of inclusion, yet 
existing DHHS regulations relating to pregnant women codify the 
presumption of exclusion: "'no pregnant woman may be a 
research subject' except under certain conditions. JH3!j When the 
regulations classify pregnant women as "vulnerable to coercion or 
undo influence,"436 it suggests that they are less autonomous or 
more easily exploited by virtue of their pregnancy.'137 Subpart 
B of the DHHS regulations for the protection of human subjects 
should be repealed or significantly revised to reflect the 
presumption that pregnant women are as competent as nonpreg-
nant persons to weigh the risks and benefits of participation in 
an approved clinical study.438 To assure the adequacy of infor-
mation about the risks and benefits to a woman's pregnancy and 
potential offspring, strengthened informed consent procedures 
might include special disclosure statements.''39 
Furthermore, in recognition of a woman's autonomous 
decisionmaking and concern for constitutional and ethical 
principles, the provisions of Subpart B that permit a paternal 
veto to a pregnant woman's participation in clinical research 
should be also eliminated.440 In the best of all worlds, a preg-
nant woman should be encouraged to discuss her participation in 
a clinical trial with the potential offspring's father.441 Yet 
pregnant women should be e.xcluded from a clinical trial. See id. Howe\'er, such a "con-
science clause" could be abused significantly and serve indirectly to e.xclude all 
pregnant women. See id. Such potential abuse, for example, has been e."qlerienced in 
the context of most health care providers refusing to do abortions. See, e.g., Amy 
Goldstein, U.S. Abortion Seruices Drop, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at A1 (reporting 
that more than 500 U.S. hospitals and clinics have stopped providing abortions since 
the 1980s}. 
435. Id. at 16 (referring to 45 C.F.R. § 46.207(a)}. 
436. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(b}. 
437. See id. Although pregnant women, and more specifically their fetuses, may 
be considered "vulnerable" in the sense of being susceptible to serious injury, the 
regulation focuses upon vulnerability in the context of limited decisionmaking capacity. 
By grouping pregnant women with children, prisoners, mentally disabled persons, and 
other disadvantaged persons in need of additional protection, it suggests a state of 
diminished capacity or distrust of their judgment during pregnancy that is misleading 
and inappropriate. 
438. Moreover, the reference to pregnant women as a "vulnerable populationO" in 
Subpart A, codified at 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3), should also be eliminated. 
439. The Committee suggested that the disclosure statement might include: "If you 
are pregnant or contemplating pregnancy, we urge you to consult your obstetrical care 
provider before deciding about participation in this study. Participation in this study 
may (does) pose a risk of (significant} harm to your pregnancy and/or your potential 
baby." 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 196 (emphasis removed). 
440. See id. at 197. Refer to subpart ill(B)(1) supra. 
441. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH REsEARCH, supra note 3, at 197 (recognizing that 
the father may have a strong emotional attachment to his unborn child). 
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women, not investigators or the state, are in the best position to 
determine whether to consult with the future father. To have the 
power to veto the participation in research gives men unreason-
able control over a woman's bodily integrity and medical 
decisionmaking authority.442 In fact, it is inconsistent that once 
a child is born, federal regulations require, under certain 
circumstances, only one parent's permission to enroll a child in 
clinical research. 443 
Until Subpart B is amended, we will continue to face mixed 
messages from the regulatory arena. Special rules for pregnant 
women as vulnerable often get carried over into special rules for 
all women of childbearing potential. Ironically, this would 
undermine our very attempts to expand the numbers of women 
in clinical studies. More importantly, we must also recognize that 
such an inference that pregnant women are less autonomous will 
perpetuate gender bias in other areas of health care. To date, the 
new NIH Guidelines are silent with respect to special rules for 
pregnant women. To further complicate the regulatory landscape, 
the FDA has yet to establish guidelines on including pregnant 
women in drug trials. 444 
D. Addressing Gender Bias 
Gender bias in clinical research must be placed in its social 
and ethical context. Two forms of gender bias may impact on the 
design and conduct of clinical studies: male bias (adopting a male 
perspective) and the male norm (the tendency to use males as 
the standard and females as problematic).445 These biases, in 
turn, are further perpetuated in the delivery of women's health 
care. 
Unconscious biases may permeate the entire scientific 
research process, influencing the research topics selected, the 
concepts examined, the study design, and the research par-
ticipants chosen for inclusion.446 Clearly, one way to address 
such gender biases may be to increase the numbers of women 
scientists active in clinical research. Toward this goal, one of the 
442. See id. 
443. See id. 
444. The CDC Policy, refer to note 233 supra, however, does provide that 
"[i]nformation on adverse differences in outcome or risk profiles for pregnant women 
may be reason for exclusion." 60 Fed. Reg. 47,949. It further states that "pregnancy 
status may need to be determined prior to enrollment for some studies and, if 
necessary, during an intervention to safeguard the participants' health." Id. 
445. See 1 WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 8. 
446. See id. 
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major priorities of the Office of Research on Women's Health 
(ORWH) is to foster the recruitment and promotion of women in 
biomedical careers.447 
In addition to increasing the number of women in biomedical 
careers, the ORWH, in collaboration with other governmental 
agencies and women's health and professional organizations, is 
examining "the appropriate integration" of women's health issues 
into medical school curricula.448 Health care professionals not 
only need to understand basic female physiology and reproductive 
biology, but also must understand aspects of disease that differ 
in women. Just as significantly, the goal of medical education 
should be to create "an understanding of how medicine has 
historically perpetuated sex-role stereotypes in definitions of 
health, illness and normality, through research and clinical prac-
tice.n449 Thus, if physicians are going to be competent to 
comprehensively address women's health needs, they must be 
able to adopt attitudes and behaviors that are culturally"co and 
gender sensitive, including an appreciation of gender differences 
in communication, interaction, and clinical decisionmaking."51 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the end, society must trust women to make decisions 
about their own health and a healthy future with their families. 
Gender bias in clinical research has left us with a large amount 
of incomplete or meaningless information on how best to address 
women's health needs. It has left pregnant women and their 
physicians totally in the dark. The common label that appears on 
447. See generally OFFICE OF REsEARCH ON WOMEN'S HEALTH, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, WOMEN IN BIOMEDICAL CAREERS (1992). Issues covered include: 
recruiting women in biomedical careers, role of models and mentors, career paths and 
rewards, reentry into a biomedical career, family responsibilities, research initiatives 
on women's health, gender sensitivity, and minority women and science. See id. at 8-
13. 
448. See HOUSE COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 156, 103d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 81 (1993); see also SENATE APPROPRIATIONS Cor.w., S. REP. No. 397, 102d Cong., 
2d Sess. 143 (1992). S. 1569 would have established an Office of Women's Health to 
work with other governmental health agencies to advance research on women's health, 
facilitate the employment of women as scientists, and expand medical school curricu-
lum on women's health. See S. REP. No. 397, supra, at 49-50. 
449. Susan Phillips, The Social Context of Women's Health: Goals and Objectiues 
for Medical Education, 152 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 507, 509 (1995). 
450. Health care providers must be particularly attentive to how women's health 
needs reflect differences in race, class, ethnicity, culture, se.'CUal orientation, and socio-
economic status. See id. at 510. 
451. See COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUC., FIFTH REPORT: WOMEN AND 
MEDICINE 23 (1995) (advocating a "new paradigm" to improve health care, including 
attention to prevention, community approaches, and education). 
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all drugs is symbolic: "'It is also not known whether [this drug] 
can cause fetal harm when administered to a pregnant woman 
or can affect reproduction capacity. [This drug] should be given 
to a pregnant woman only if clearly needed.' "452 It is more than 
a warning for pregnant women and their physicians; rather it is 
a warning to all of us that if we do not presume that all women 
can be trusted to make decisions about clinical research and 
health care, we will never eradicate gender bias. 
452. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(6)(i)(c). 
